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The Effect of Teachers’ Unions on
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Union Election Certiﬁcations in Three
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Michael F. Lovenheim, SIEPR, Stanford University
Using a unique data set on teachers’ union electioncertiﬁcationsfrom
Iowa, Indiana, and Minnesota, I estimatetheeffectofteachers’unions
on school district resources and on student educational attainment.
My empirical strategy allows for nonparametric leads and lags of
union age. I ﬁnd no impact on teacher pay or per student district
expenditures but that unions increase teacher employment by 5%. I
ﬁnd no class size effect because of enrollment increases in unionized
districts, and I estimate that unions have no net effect on high school
dropout rates. These ﬁndings highlight the importance of correctly
measuring unionization status.
Public school teacher collective bargaining has become a stable ﬁxture in
the American education system over the past 40 years. For example, as of
1988, all but seven states had passed a law either allowing for the right of
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teachers to bargain collectively or explicitly requiring districts to bargain
withteachers’unions.Furthermore,onlyfourstateshadstatutesprohibiting
collective bargaining between public school districts and teachers (Freeman
and Valletta 1988). By 2004, 45.1% of public school teachers were members
of a labor union that exists for the purpose of collective bargaining, and
50.8% were covered by a collective bargaining contract.
1
Despite, or perhaps because of, the large rise in teacher organization,
teachers’ unions remain controversial. Opponents of teachers’ unions ar-
gue that these organizations take reform power away from administrators
and parents as well as drain district resources (Haar 1996; Moe 2001).
Advocates of teachers’ unionization, however, believe that empowering
educators who are in the classroom bolsters student achievement by al-
lowing for resources to be distributed in a more effective manner and to
be used more efﬁciently (Retsinas 1982). This debate is particularly rel-
evant today as many reformers push for more competition in primary
and secondary schooling. Proponents of increased school competition
suggest that introducing more competition into the system will reduce
the importance of teachers’ unions and partially undo any deleterious
impacts these unions may have on districts (Chubb and Moe 1988; Moe
2001). The importance of this argument is reduced if teachers’ unioni-
zation has no negative effect on school districts or students.
This article analyzes the effect of teachers’ unions on the allocation of
school district resources as well as on student academic attainment. His-
torically, a major impediment to conducting this type of research has been
the lack of data on which districts have teachers’ unions and when they
ﬁrst organized. To remedy this problem, I have hand-collected teachers’
union election certiﬁcation data for all school districtsin threemidwestern
states: Iowa, Indiana, and Minnesota. Because these data are available only
in paper format at each state’s Public Employment Relations Board ofﬁce,
this information has not been used before in any analysis of teachers’
unionization. These data allow me to construct a detailed panel of school
districts that contains accurate union representation histories for every
district in the sample.
Using data from the 1972–91 Census/Survey of Government (COG/
SOG), I estimate difference-in-difference models with nonparametric
leads and lags for union age that allow me to analyze the time pattern of
the impact of unions on school district resources. This analyticframework
is unique in the teachers’ union literature as it requires knowledge of each
district’s union status in each year covered by the sample. The election
certiﬁcation data I collected contain such information, and I therefore am
omissions, and conclusions are my own. Contact the author at mlovenhe@stanford
.edu.
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able to trace out the time pattern of union effects on school district
resources in a manner that puts little structure on this pattern. Further-
more, by examining the pre-election trends, I can determinewhetherthere
is any evidence that changes in educational inputs affect union election
timing. Previous studies were unable to undertake this type of detailed
analysis because of a lack of information on union status in every year
covered by the sample.
In contrast to the majority of other studies of the impact of teachers’
unions, I ﬁnd that organization for the purpose of collective bargaining
has little effect on educational inputs. Similar to the ﬁndings of such
studies as Smith (1972), Balfour (1974), Zuelke and Frohreich (1977), and
Kleiner and Petree (1988), my results indicate no increase in teacher pay,
either in the short run or the long run, due to unionization.
2 I ﬁnd that
full-timeteacheremploymentincreasesbyabout5%butthatunionization
also is associated with an increase in enrollment in union relative to non-
union districts, which offsets any reductions in student-teacher ratios due
to the employment increase. While the relative enrollment increases in
newly unionized districts could be evidence of selection bias in my es-
timates, I ﬁnd little evidence of such bias. My results further indicate that
per student current operating expenditures respond negligibly to teachers’
unionization.
Finally, I estimate education production functions using the high school
dropout rate as the measure of educational output, which is calculated
from the 1970–90 U.S. Census. Use of this outcome measure is neces-
sitated by the lack of historical student outcome data at the school district
level and should be interpreted as providing suggestive evidence of the
link between unionization and educational outcomes. I ﬁnd that teachers’
unions have no discernible net effect on high school dropout rates.
My ﬁndings are consistent with those of many of the studies on private
sector unions. Freeman and Kleiner (1990) ﬁnd very modest wage in-
creases among newly unionized ﬁrms in the 1980s that they sampled,
relative to similar nonunion ﬁrms. Dinardo and Lee (2004) estimate the
effect of unionization on business survival, employment, output, pro-
ductivity, and wages using a regression discontinuity framework. Local
to the 50% election vote discontinuity, they ﬁnd that private sectorunions
have little effect on these outcome measures. In recent work, Lee and Mas
(2008) use an event study analysis to show that private sector unions have
a sizable negative effect on excess stock market returns. They also present
evidence that this negative effect goes away around the election discon-
2 In his comprehensive review of the literature, Freeman (1986) reports that the
majority of teachers’ union impact studies ﬁnd a positive effect of unionization on
wages of between 3% and 21%. He also reports wage premia on the order of
5%–10% for public sector protective services unions.528 Lovenheim
tinuity of 50%. Interestingly, vote shares in favor of unionization among
teachers typically are close to 100%. Given the large institutional differ-
ences between public and private sector unions, however, it is difﬁcult to
draw too many conclusions from comparisons of results across sectors.
A literature more directly related to my analysis examines the effects
of teachers’ unions on the inputs to and outputs of education.
3 The results
and conclusions of this article are provocative in that they are at odds
with most of these previous studies. Using cross-sectional data on the
existence of teacher collective bargaining contracts, Eberts and Stone
(1986) estimate that teachers’ unions increase district costs by 15% but
that they also increase educational productivity by 3%. In a study that
employs teachers’ union membership data from the Current Population
Survey, Baugh and Stone (1982) ﬁnd that unions increase teacher pay by
between 4% and 12%. Using similar data, Moore and Raisian (1987)
estimate a teachers’ union wage premium between 3% and 6%. In con-
trast, Kleiner and Petree (1988) ﬁnd that union membership and the per-
centage covered by contracts have a negligible effect on wages but have
a positive and signiﬁcant impact on SAT scores and nonwage expenditures
per student at the state aggregate level.
In the most comprehensive study of teachers’ union impacts to date,
Hoxby (1996) constructs a district-level panel from the 1972–92 Census
of Governments. This study is an advancement over previous cross-sec-
tional work because it uses school district ﬁxed effects to overcome the
endogeneity of union status inherent in such estimates. The study ﬁnds
the presence of a teachers’ union, as indicated by the existence of contracts
combined with over 50% teachers’ union membership and the district
reporting it engages in collective bargaining, increases average teacher pay
by over 5% and current operating expenditures per student by almost
3%, while decreasing student-teacher ratios by 1.1. Hoxby also reports
evidence that unions increase high school dropout rates.
As a meansto understandthedifferencesbetweentheestimatesIpresent
in this study and many of the estimates reported in previous empirical
studies of teachers’ unions, I compare my unionization measureandunion
impact estimates with those derived from the COG Labor Relations Sur-
vey, which is the union measure used most notably in Hoxby (1996). I
present suggestive evidence that the results disagree due to nonclassical
measurement error in the COG union measure, which points to potential
measurement problems with the COG LaborRelationsSurveyratherthan
any analytical or coding errors committed by Hoxby (1996) in her careful
study. The results of this article underscore the importance of correctly
measuring union status in union impact analyses, and I argue that the
3 See Freeman (1986) for an overview of the literature.Effect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 529
election certiﬁcation data I use are a more reliable measure of union status
than those used in previous work.
I. Theoretical Predictions
Because no comprehensive theoretical model of public sector union
behavior exists, it is not clear a priori how unions will affect either district
resources or student achievement. A central purpose of any labor union
is to maximize the well-being of its members. In order to accomplish this
goal, teachers’ unions often advocate for higher wages, fewer hours, and
higher beneﬁts for teachers. If these unions are successful in advocating
for such changes, then districts might redistribute resources toward
teacher pay and away from other areas of expenditure that may be more
effective at increasing student achievement. As unions become more en-
trenched and gain more power over time, such effects could amplify as
teachers extract more and more rents from districts. In addition, because
unions often make it more difﬁcult fordistrictstoﬁreteachersandbecause
union contracts typically do not involve performance-based compensa-
tion, any increase in teacher pay will not necessarily be correlated with
an increase in teacher output. Thus, the marginal returns to teacher pay
may fall due to teacher organization.
4
Even a purely rent-seeking union may have a nonnegative effect on
student achievement. Because unions often are focused on improving
working conditions as well as pay (Retsinas 1982), teacher organization
may lead to smaller class sizes and more satisﬁed teachers. The increase
in workers’ job satisfaction due to unionization is referred to as a “union
voice” effect, and there is evidence in the private sector literature that
giving workers a voice with which to change their working environment
increases productivity (Gunderson 2005). If teachers protect themselves
from perceived or actual administrative abuses by exercising their union
voice, unionization can have positive productivity effects. Additionally,
any increase in wages or beneﬁts could attract better teachers, thus in-
creasing average teacher productivity.
In contrast to the rent-seeking model of union behavior, teachers’
unions may seek explicitly to maximize student achievement. If there is
misallocation of district resources absent unionization,
5 teachers’ unions
can use their collective power and their ﬁrsthand experience in the class-
room to help redistribute resources in a manner that is more effective for
education. Similarly, unions may have a positive impact on districts if
4 This is typically called the “rent-seeking” model of union behavior, as unions
seek to extract rents from the district without regard to their impact on students.
5 Such a misallocation could arise due to the politicization of funding decisions
at the local level or from inefﬁcient district management. See Chubb and Moe (1988)
for a discussion of these issues.530 Lovenheim
they divert more local government funds from other sources to schools.
This would result in an increase in the level of funding for schools but
not necessarily a change in the distribution.
These predictions of the impact of unionization on school districts and
students are not mutually exclusive. Unions might be advocating simul-
taneously for increases in teacher pay, for better working conditions, and
for resources that will more effectively serve students. To the extent that
these outcomes have differential effects on achievement, simple models
of union behavior do not yield unique predictions about the impact of
unionization. It therefore is necessary to analyze empirically the effect
that teachers’ unions have on students and school districts in order to
evaluate the claims made by both advocates and opponents of these
unions.
II. Data
A. Teachers’ Union Election Certiﬁcation Data
Studies of the impact of teachers’ unions have used two forms of union-
ization measures, depending on the level of observation in the study. If
the study is at the teacher level, the union measure typically is whether
the teacher is a member of a union (Baugh and Stone 1982; Moore and
Raisian 1987). The largest problem with using union membership data is
that teachers can be employed in unionized districts without being mem-
bers of the union. Furthermore, being a union member does not neces-
sarily mean that the union engages in collective bargaining; many unions
in the United States function merely as professional organizations.
6
Studies that take the school district as the level of observation tend to
use the existence of a contract or collective bargaining agreement as the
measure of teachers’ unionization (Woodbury 1985; Eberts and Stone
1986; Eberts and Stone 1987; Kleiner and Petree 1988; Hoxby 1996).
Absent measurement error, a collective bargaining agreement will accu-
rately measure the presence of a union as long as all unions obtain con-
tracts.
7 According to the NEA and AFT, which representthevastmajority
of teachers’ unions in the United States, it is rare for a unionized district
to never obtain a contract, although there can be a lag between union
formation and the culmination of collective bargaining in the form of a
contract.
No previous union effects study has been based on data that accurately
describe both the timing of unionization and the existence of a teachers’
6 Both the National Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation
of Teachers (AFT) began this way before the ofﬁcial onset of collective bargaining
for teachers.
7 Being unionized is necessary for engaging in collective bargaining, but a union
that negotiates with a school district is not guaranteed to obtain a contract.Effect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 531
union in a given district. In order to obtain an improved measure of
teacher unionization, I hand-collected teachers’ union certiﬁcation dates
from union election certiﬁcations housed in the Public Employment Re-
lations Board (PERB) ofﬁces in Iowa, Indiana, and Minnesota. When
teachers in a district organize for the purpose of collective bargaining, the
state PERB conducts an election. If over 50% of all schooldistrictteachers
vote “yes,” then the board certiﬁes the union as the sole bargaining rep-
resentative of the teachers. The date of the election certiﬁcation is thus
the ofﬁcial date of unionization in each district.
To increase the accuracy of my union measure, I supplemented the
certiﬁcation data by searching for case law on LexisNexis as well as on
the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board and the Iowa State
Teachers’ Association Web sites that indicated when a district began col-
lectively bargaining with teachers. If there was a negotiated contract in a
district prior to the certiﬁcation vote, it is likely to be picked up through
these searches. Furthermore, because the unions in the three states in this
analysis all are members of the NEA, groups of locals are aggregated into
“UniServ” districts, which oversee the bargaining and governance of the
union locals. I validated the election certiﬁcation data by contacting the
UniServ districts and requesting the date of ﬁrst contract and the date of
ﬁrst certiﬁcation for each union local in their district. Many UniServ
districts did not have this information, which highlights the difﬁculty in
collecting accurate union data. For the UniServ districts that had this
information, I found that the election certiﬁcation data augmented with
the Web searches accurately represented the timing of union formation.
In the few cases in which there was a discrepancy, I used the date given
by the UniServ ofﬁce rather than the date recorded from the PERBofﬁce.
8
Iowa, Indiana, and Minnesota are particularly attractive states for this
analysis because all three passed “duty-to-bargain” laws in a time period
covered by my outcome data. Prior to 1972, all three states allowed col-
lective bargaining between teachers and districts, but a school district did
not have a duty to bargain with teachers if the administration did not
choose to do so. As a result, there were few contracts in place prior to
1972.
9 These contracts were all due to “voluntary recognition” of the
union by the school district. Beginning in Minnesota in 1972 and followed
8 If two districts merge, necessitating a new union election, then the election data
will assign this merger date as the date of unionization even if both districts were
unionized prior to the merger. To each merged district, I assigned a unionization
date equal to the earliest unionization date of the original districts. I obtained these
dates from the Web searches and UniServ districts, as described above.
9 The supplemental Web searches and the validation of the election data suggest
that I am accurately measuring the existence of contracts in the small number of
districts that had teachers’ union contracts prior to the passage of their state’s duty-
to-bargain law.532 Lovenheim
by Indiana in 1973 and Iowa in 1975, the states passed duty-to-bargain
laws, which mandated that a school districtadministrationislegallybound
to bargain in good faith with employees if the employees so desire. These
laws dramatically increased unionization rates among teachers in these
states (see ﬁg. 1).
Because there was little voluntary recognition of teachers’ unions by
school districts prior to the passage of the duty-to-bargain laws in these
states,
10 the election certiﬁcations measure the time of ﬁrst organization
for the purpose of collective bargaining.
11 Figure 1 presents the distri-
bution of teachers’ union certiﬁcation years by state. The spikes in the
distributions correspond to years in which astatepassedaduty-to-bargain
law. The small number of districts that were unionized priorto thepassage
of the state law did so through voluntary recognition by the district
administration. As is evident in ﬁgure 1, passage of a law establishing
teacher collective bargaining was a major determinant of winning a union-
ization election.
12 This trend is consistent with those reportedbySaltzman
(1985), who argues that unionization laws were largely a cause and not
an outcome of teacher collective bargaining. The data show that teachers’
unions established a signiﬁcant presence in the public education system
over the time period of this analysis in Iowa, Indiana, and Minnesota; all
three states had school district teachers’ unionization rates of over 75%
by 1987.
The union certiﬁcation data have several advantages over the measures
used in earlier analyses. The ﬁrst is that, instead of measuring whether
teachers have a contract, which is the outcome of collective bargaining,
I measure whether they have an agent certiﬁed by the state to engage in
collective bargaining. However, the validation study showed that, in the
vast majority of cases, unions negotiate a contract within 1 school year
of certiﬁcation, and I found no districts in which the union did notachieve
a contract. This result suggests that, while the existence of a union and
the existence of a negotiated contract are conceptually distinct, in practice
they are similar. Analyzing the effect of winning a unionization election
as opposed to negotiating a contract should yield comparable results.
10 When I exclude voluntarily recognized unions from the analysis, the results
are unchanged.
11 InMinnesota,theduty-to-bargainlawautomaticallydeclaredanexisting“teach-
ers’ council” to have won a certiﬁcation election if the majority of the council’s
members belong to one teachers’ organization. While it is not entirely clear in the
data which of these councils were already engaged in collective bargaining prior to
1972, these districts are marked as being “grandfathered.”Allresultsandconclusions
are fully robust to dropping these districts from the analysis. Results excluding
grandfathered districts are available upon request.
12 Unlike in the private sector, these elections are rarely unsuccessful. In fact, in
my sample, there are no districts in which an election was lost.Fig. 1.—Distribution of teachers’ union election certiﬁcations by state from the teachers’
union election certiﬁcation data described in the text.534 Lovenheim
Second, because the certiﬁcation dates are obtained from ofﬁcial state
documents, there will be less measurement error than in data based on
survey responses. Finally, the certiﬁcation measure will not confound the
existence of a union whose purposeiscollectivebargainingwithateachers’
organization because purely professional organizations will not engage in
a unionization election.
B. Other Data Sources
I combine my teachers’ union election certiﬁcation data with data from
the Census/Survey of Governments (COG/SOG) Employment and Fi-
nance Surveys to construct measures of real monthly full-time teacher
pay, full-time teacher employment, student-teacherratios,andrealcurrent
operating expenditures (COE) per student for each district in the sample.
All expenditures are inﬂated to real 2004 dollars using the CPI-U. I use
student-teacher ratios as my measure of class sizes in this analysis, but it
is important to note that class size and student-teacher ratios may differ
in important ways. In particular, if unions bargain for more preparatory
time and more support staff, the student-teacher ratio will be affected but
not necessarily the number of students in each classroom. Nevertheless,
this is the best measure available in the data, and it measures the prevailing
human resources per student in each district. I have district-level obser-
vations for the years 1972–91, excluding 1986 due to data availability.
Appendix A contains further details about the COG/SOG data.
In addition, I merge the certiﬁcation data with the 1970, 1980, and 1990
U.S. Census school district summary ﬁles
13 to measure high school drop-
out rates using the following formula:
High school dropout rate p
total high school enrollment
1  # 100. (1) ()
total population 14–18 years old
I also calculate total population, percentage urban, average real income,
median real gross rent, percentage of families in poverty, percentage un-
employed, percentage black, percentage Hispanic, percentage with a high
school diploma or some college, percentage with at least a BA, percentage
enrolled in private school, and total public school enrollment from these
data for each district in my sample.
13 All 1990 Census estimates are from the School District Data Book. The 1980
census data are taken from the 1980 Summary Tape File 3-F (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1980), and the 1970 data are taken from the 1970 Census Fourth Count
(Population) (U.S. Department of Commerce 1970) and the Census of Population
and Housing, 1970: Fifth Count Tallies: Sample Data for School Districts (U.S.
Department of Education 1970).Effect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 535
III. The Effect of Teachers’ Unions on Education Production
A. Trends in School District Resources
Before undertaking an empirical examination of the effect of teachers’
unions on school district resources, it is instructive to examine trends in
school resources by state and union status in order to inform the empirical
methodology. Trends in log real average teacher pay and log real COE
per student are presented in ﬁgures 2 and 3, respectively, by state and by
when districts organized with respect to passage of their state’s duty-to-
bargain law.
14 Looking at ﬁgure 2, across all types of districts there is a
general downward trend in teacher pay in the three states. Thisdownward
trend is unlikely to be caused by unionization as it begins prior to passage
of the duty-to-bargain lawsinIndianaandIowaandcontinuesthroughout
the sample.
15 Figure 2 suggests that any empirical model that seeks to
identify union effects on teacher pay needs to account for this secular
trend. Also, while real teacher pay exhibits some year-to-year noise, the
yearly means move very similarly across union and nonunion districts as
well as across districts that unionized at different times relative to passage
of the duty-to-bargain laws. The means presented in ﬁgure 2 thus fore-
shadow one of the central results of this article, that teachers’ unions have
no effect on average teacher pay. Figure 3 yields a similar conclusion to
that of ﬁgure 2; across all school district types within each state, the year-
to-year variation in expenditures is virtually identical, and there is little
evidence of a break from trend when the duty-to-bargain lawsareenacted.
One interpretation of the trends presented in ﬁgures 2 and 3 is that
threat effects driven by passage of duty-to-bargain laws cause spillovers
that affect districts that unionize and districts that do not unionizeequally.
Because duty-to-bargain laws led to a signiﬁcant increase in the likelihood
of unionization, the potential for union threat effects are particularly
relevant in this setting (Farber 2003).
16 However, teacher pay and current
14 Trends for log numberofteachers,logstudent-teacherratios,andlogenrollment
are shown in appendix ﬁgs. B1–B3, respectively. The conclusions drawn from these
ﬁgures are similar to those from log teacher pay and log COE per student.
15 While there is an upward spike in teacher pay in 1976 in Iowa, which is the
year after passage of the duty-to-bargain law, the same upward spike is exhibited
in Indiana and Minnesota and across all school districts, suggesting thatitis spurious
noise in the data rather than a treatment effect of unionization.
16 There is considerable debate in the literature over the existence and size of
union threat effects. Most of the evidence focuses on private sector unions, where
some studies have found unionization raises nonunion wages (Kahn 1980; Neumark
and Wachter 1995), reduces nonunion wage dispersion (Kahn and Curme 1987),
and increases nonunion beneﬁts (Freeman 1981). However, Farber (2003) ﬁnds less
concrete evidence of union threat effects on nonunion wages. While there is no
evidence in the literature on threat effects of teachers’ unions, Ichniowski, Freeman,
and Lauer (1989) ﬁnd that police compensation increases equally among those that536
Fig. 2.—Trends in log real average teacher pay by state. The data come from the teachers’
union election certiﬁcation data and Census/Survey of Governments, as described in the text.
In each panel, the vertical line represents the year in which a duty-to-bargain law was passed
in the state. “Never Unionize” districts are those that do not have a successful union election
vote by 2004, “Early Unionize” districts are those that unionize prior to passage of their state’s
duty-to-bargain law, “Late Unionize” districts are those that unionize more than 1 year after
passage of their state’s duty-to-bargain law, and “On-Time Unionize” districts are those that
unionize within 1 year of passage of their state’s duty-to-bargain law. “Non Duty to Bargain
States” are the 18 states that did not have a duty-to-bargain law as of 1982: Alabama, Arkansas,
Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, Nebraska,
New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. All means
are inﬂated to 2004 dollars using the CPI-U.537
Fig. 3.—Trends in log real current operating expenditures per student by state. The data
come from the teachers’ union election certiﬁcation data and Census/Survey of Governments,
as described in the text. In each panel, the vertical line represents the year in which a duty-
to-bargain law was passed in the state. “Never Unionize” districts are those that do not have
a successful union election vote by 2004, “Early Unionize” districts are those that unionize
prior to passage of their state’s duty-to-bargain law, “Late Unionize” districts are those that
unionize more than 1 year after passage of their state’s duty-to-bargain law, and “On-Time
Unionize” districts are those that unionize within 1 year of passage of their state’s duty-to-
bargain law. “Non Duty to Bargain States” are the 18 states that did not have a duty-to-
bargain law as of 1982: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. All means are inﬂated to 2004 dollars using the CPI-U.538 Lovenheim
operating expenditures per student do not exhibit breaks from trend sur-
rounding passage of duty-to-bargain laws, and districts that unionized
prior to the passage of their state’s duty-to-bargain law exhibit year-to-
year variation identical to those who never unionize and to those who
unionize later. This correlation is unlikely if the driving force behind these
trends is threat effects brought about by stronger collective bargaining
laws, because the “early unionized” districts already have collectively
bargained contracts in place and are unlikely to renegotiate prior to their
contracts expiring.
More direct evidence on the relevance of threat effects can be obtained
by comparing the trends in ﬁgures 2 and 3 to those from the 18 states
without duty-to-bargain laws.
17 Trends for school districts in those states
are presented in ﬁgures 2 and 3 (as well as in appendix ﬁgs. B1–B3). They
closely track those in Iowa, Indiana, and Minnesota, which suggests that
union threat effects are minimal for these resource measures in the three
states covered by this analysis.
Another way to examine the presence of union threat effects is to
conduct a cross-state difference-in-difference analysis of school district
resources, comparing mean changes in Iowa, Indiana, and Minnesotafrom
before and after passage of the duty-to-bargain laws to changes in states
that did not have duty-to-bargain laws and did not pass such a law during
this time period. Table 1 presents estimates from such an analysis using
the 1972, 1977, and 1982 Census of Governments. The ﬁrst column in
each panel contains state-level means for Iowa, Indiana, and Minnesota,
and the second column contains means for the 18 control states. The third
column presents difference-in-difference estimates between each year and
1972, and the fourth column shows the standard error of this estimate.
The ﬁfth and sixth columns present the results from pooled difference-
in-difference regressions that use all 3 years.
The cross-state estimates in table 1 show a negative effect of teachers’
unions on wages of between 4.0% and 5.6%, although the estimate is not
statistically different from zero when state-speciﬁc trends are included in
the model. While some of the estimates in panel B suggest that unions
signiﬁcantly decreased teacher employment by over 20%, when I control
for state-speciﬁc trends, I ﬁnd no discernible effect. Panel C suggests that
unions had a small effect on student-teacher ratios that is not statistically
distinguishable from zero in most columns. Finally, in panel D, I ﬁnd
evidence of a negative effect of teachers’ unions on per student expen-
ditures. Together, the estimates in table 1 argue against large union threat
unionize and those that do not unionize due to stronger bargaining laws. This is
the only evidence on public sector union threat effects in the literature.
17 These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, South Car-
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Table 1
Cross-State Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of Teachers’
Unions on School District Resources
Year
Treated
States
(1)
Untreated
States
(2)
Difference in
Difference
(3)
Standard
Error
(4)
State
Fixed
Effects
(5)
State
Trends
(6)
A. Ln(Real Monthly Full-Time Teacher Pay)
1972 8.189 8.050
1977 8.074 7.983 .048** (.017) .040** .056
1982 8.014 7.916 .041 (.026) (.015) (.044)
B. Ln(Full-Time Teacher Employment)
1972 4.164 3.461
1977 4.255 3.760 .208** (.043) .220** .012
1982 4.171 3.871 .403** (.091) (.059) (.052)
C. Ln(Student-Teacher Ratio)
1972 2.845 2.805
1977 2.717 2.662 .015 (.022) .042** .009
1982 2.655 2.571 .045 (.029) (.020) (.022)
D. Ln(Real COE per Student)
1972 8.343 8.141
1977 8.412 8.273 .063** (.030) .081** .046
1982 8.459 8.345 .088** (.034) (.028) (.052)
Source.—Author’s calculation from the 1972, 1977, and 1982 Census of Governments, as described in
the text.
Note.—Col. 1 contains yearly means for Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota. Col. 2 contains means for the
18 states that did not have a duty-to-bargain law as of 1982: Alabama, Arkansas,Arizona,Colorado,Georgia,
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas,
Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Col. 3 contains the difference-in-difference estimates from the ﬁrst two
columns, which are the difference between “treated” and “untreated” in the given year minus the difference
between “treated” and “untreated” in 1972. Col. 4 presents the standard errors of these differences, clustered
at the state level. Cols. 5 and 6 present difference-in-difference estimates using all 3 years that control for
state and year ﬁxed effects in col. 5 and control for state and year ﬁxed effects as well as state-speciﬁc linear
year trends in col. 6. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses in cols. 5 and 6.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
effects in Iowa, Indiana, and Minnesota, because in most cases state-
average resources are moving in the opposite direction than one would
predict if unions had a positive effect on teacher pay, teacher employment,
and per student expenditures in all school districts in the treated states.
While comparing trends in states that did not enact duty-to-bargain
laws to trends in Iowa, Indiana, and Minnesota yields insight into the
existence of threat effects and union spillovers, it is difﬁcult to interpret
the estimates in table 1 as causal because the 18 control states may ex-
perience different secular variation in school resources that will confound
identiﬁcation of the treatment effects of interest. In the absence of union
spillovers, a more credible strategy is to use nonunion districts in each
state to control for counterfactual trends. The remainder of this article
uses such variation to identify union effects on school district resources
and on student academic attainment.540 Lovenheim
B. The Effect of Teachers’ Unions on School District Resource
Allocation: Empirical Methodology
To analyze the effect of teachers’ unions on school district resources,
I estimate the following equation on the Census/Survey of Governments
data described in Section II.A and in appendix A:
10
Y p b  g I(t  year p j)  t  f   , (2)  ist 0 j c is ti s t jp5
where is the log of an outcome variable of interest, are state-by- Y f ist st
year ﬁxed effects, are district ﬁxed effects, and is an error term. The t  ii s t
term refers to the calendar year in which district i became certiﬁed, yearc
and the expression is an indicator variable that equals one I(t  year p j) c
if district i is j years from a unionization election in year t and zero
otherwise. For districts that never complete a union election and for
observations for which the relative time to unionization is outside the
event window, these indicator variables are set to zero. I choose an event
window from 5 years prior to 10 year post union election because sample
sizes drop outside of this range. All district-year observations for which
the time since certiﬁcation is greater than 10 years are dropped from the
analysis.
Due to data limitations, previous studies have modeled union effects
by including a dummy variable for union status in their regressions. Equa-
tion (2) is more general than using a single union dummy because it
semiparametrically estimates both short-term and long-term effects of
unionization;
18 the inclusion of dummy variables for each year relative to
unionization imposes no structure on the pattern of time trends either
pre- or post-treatment. This ﬂexibility is important because unions may
have nonlinear impacts on districts over time that will be masked by
imposing the parametric assumption that the effects are equal.
19 Thus, the
full-time pattern of union impacts over the event window allowed by the
data will be estimated by equation (2), whereas standard models of union
impacts are much more restrictive.
Another major advantage of equation (2) is that it includes district and
18 The speciﬁcation is semiparametric because I impose the parametric assumption
that the relativetimeeffectsandthestate-speciﬁcyeareffectsareadditivelyseparable.
This is a standard assumption built into linear regression models.
19 One might expect the time pattern of union effects to differ over timeforseveral
reasons. If unions focus ﬁrst on gaining a foothold in the district rather than on
affecting change, the short-run and long-run union impacts will differ. Unions also
may need time to learn how to successfully bargain with administrators. Finally,
unions can change the administration in the long run by supporting pro-union
candidates for school board and local ofﬁce. Note also that unions likely affect
long-run equilibrium district outcomes past 10 years in a manner that I am unable
to capture with my data.Effect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 541
time ﬁxed effects. This feature contrasts with most of the previous work
on union impacts, which has been cross sectional (Freeman 1986). Such
a design often is necessitated by the lack of time series data on teacher
unionization, but if unionization depends on unobservable factors that
are correlated with both the decision to unionize and district outcomes
(e.g., a bad administration), cross-sectional estimates will be biased. In
contrast, the ﬁxed effects model compares the same district at different
times relative to the unionization year and controls for any unobservable
(and unchanging) effects.
The central identifying assumption of the model is
E( FI(t  year p j) Gj  [5,10],t,f ) p 0. (3) ist c is t
Satisfying (3) necessitates that, conditional on the ﬁxed effects, the timing
of unionization is uncorrelated with potential outcomes. If there is se-
lection into unionization based on pre-union wages or expenditures, es-
timates of the gj parameters from equation (2) will be biased. In addition,
if school boards anticipate unionization and enact policies to attempt to
defeat the organization movement in the district, it will become apparent
in the pre-election relative time to unionization estimates. I therefore
estimate g’s prior to the union election in order to test for any (j ! 0)
selection on the outcome variable that may be a causal factor in the
decision to hold an election. Rather than controlling for differential pre-
treatment trends across districts that do and do not unionize, my differ-
ence-in-difference setup allows me to test directly for the existence of
such trends. Note that, because the Census of Governments panel begins
in 1972 and the collective bargaining laws were passed in 1972, 1973, and
1975 in Minnesota, Indiana, and Iowa, respectively, the relative time dum-
mies with will be identiﬁed predominantly off of districts that un- j ! 0
ionize relatively later in the sample.
20
The Census/Survey of Governments contains no school district de-
mographic information. Given this limitation, it is important to think
about why school districts unionized when they did. I investigate this
20 Because the school district panel is unbalanced with respect to relative time to
unionization, each is identiﬁed off of a potentially different set of school districts. gj
See appendix table B1 for the number ofobservationsandthedistributionofdistricts
across states that identify each relative year effect. The unbalanced nature of the
panel will cause the estimates to be biased if there are unobserved (or unmodeled)
heterogeneous treatment effects. To test for this source of bias, I estimate eq. (2)
separately for those districts that unionize within 1 year of their state’s passage of
the duty-to-bargain law. Results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those
presented below, which is not surprising given that over 84% of treated observations
fall into this group. I also estimate eq. (2) using a balanced panel of school districts
that I observe in every survey year. These results are presented in appendix table
B2 and are similar to results from using the unbalanced panel, although the standard
errors become larger due to sample size reductions.542 Lovenheim
question by comparing means of observable district demographic char-
acteristics by district unionization status and timing using the 1980 U.S.
Census data described in Section II. Columns A and B of table 2 compare
districts that never unionize to districts that do unionize as of 2004. The
table indicates that districts that never unionize have more high school
graduates, have fewer high school dropouts, are less urban, have a lower
private school enrollment rate, are smaller, and have a higher poverty rate
but lower median rent than districts that unionize. Columns D and E in
table 2 compare districts that unionized within a year of the passage of
their state’s duty-to-bargain law and those that unionized later. The com-
parison of means suggests that districts that unionized immediately fol-
lowing passage of their state’s duty-to-bargain law had a larger percentage
of adults with a bachelor’s degree; were larger; were more urban; had a
higher median rent, unemployment rate, and district enrollment; but had
a lower poverty rate than those that unionized later. Overall, this exercise
suggests that districts in larger cities and suburbs organized earlier, while
the more rural districts unionized later or not at all.
21
What effect can one expect these differences to have on the estimates
from equation (2) given that the parameter of interest in this study is the
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)?
22 Note that selection into
unionization based on perceived or actual gains from organizing will not
bias identiﬁcation of the ATT; such selection only will bias identiﬁcation
of the average treatment effect. Because the district ﬁxed effects control
for any time-invariant differences in outcome levels among the school
districts, what is needed to identify the ATT is for the state-speciﬁc year
effects to accurately reﬂect the counterfactual trends in the dependent
variables for the treated observations. Correctly identifying istherefore fst
21 There are many explanations for this trend in the literature on the history of
teachers’ unions. First, administrative abuses were most severe in the larger and
more urban districts, therefore inducing a union vote. Second, the urban districts
tended to be more industrialized and to have a higher fraction of the populace with
union membership. These populations may have been more favorable to teachers’
unions, thereby increasing the returns to unionizing. Finally, there are historical
reasons that the NEA and AFT were focused on the cities: the NEA started project
URBAN in 1968 speciﬁcally to target city school districts as a response to AFT
successes there. See Murphy (1990) for a detailed history of teacher organization.
22 Most of the differences between the districts that never unionize, the districts
that unionize early, and the districts that unionize later are due to the urban/rural
distinction. When I drop all districts that have census blocks in urban areas, the
panel becomes much more balanced with respect to the observables in table 2.
Results from estimation of eq. (2) with this sample are presented in appendix table
B3, which shows that the union impact estimates do not change appreciably, nor
do the substantive conclusions from those estimates change, when this restriction
is imposed.T
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the main difﬁculty in estimating the treatment effect on the treated using
equation (2).
The state-speciﬁc year effects are identiﬁed off state-speciﬁc yearly
variation in the dependent variable from thecontrolgroup(i.e.,nontreated
observations). In the main results presented in Section III.C.1, I estimate
equation (2) using all districts that never unionize combined with all
district-year observations for which the relative time to union election is
less than or equal to 10. The control group in this sample is composed
of never-unionized districts and those district-yearobservationsforwhich
the relative time to unionization is less than 5. This sample is attractive
because it uses all observations that arguably are unaffected by the treat-
ment, which allows for the most power in identifying all parameters of
equation (2). In Section III.C.2, I show a series of robustness checks that
illustrate that my estimates are not particularly sensitive to the control
group used.
C. The Effect of Teachers’ Unions on School District
Resource Allocation: Results
1. Baseline Results
Figures 4–7 depict the estimates of from equation (2) for log real gj
monthly full-time teacher pay, log full-time teacher employment, log stu-
dent-teacher ratios, and log real current operating expenditures per stu-
dent, respectively. In each ﬁgure, the points represent the estimates of the
g coefﬁcients from each relative-year-to-union-election dummy variable,
and the height of the bars extending from each point represent the bounds
of the 95% conﬁdence interval calculated from the standard errors that
are clustered at the school district level.
23 Full regression estimates for the
results in ﬁgures 4–7 are reported in appendix table B1.
As predicted by the trends in ﬁgures 2 and 3, the results consistently
indicate that unions have little impact on school district resource levels.
Focusing on ﬁgure 4, there is no evidence that teachers’ unions increase
teacher pay;
24 none of the point estimates are statistically distinguishable
from zero at the 5% level, and most are less than 2% in magnitude. There
also are no evident pre-election trends or anticipation effects that suggest
that there is selection in union election timing based on teacherpaytrends.
23 For ease of interpretation, I drop the relative time indicator variable for j p
(the year prior to unionization) throughout this analysis. The coefﬁcients 1 gj
therefore identify treatment effects relative to the effect for the year prior to union-
ization, . Note that in ﬁgs. 4–8 I include a zero for the point estimates in relative g1
year but the lack of standard error bars reﬂects that this zero is imposed j p 1,
rather than estimated.
24 It is important to note these are average wages. Unions may change the wage
structure within districts without shifting the mean.Effect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 545
Fig. 4.—The effect of teachers’ unions on log real monthly full-time teacher pay. The points
represent coefﬁcient estimates from estimation of eq. (2) on the 1972–91 Census/Survey of
Governments data, as described in the text. The bars extending from each point show the
bounds of the 95% conﬁdence interval calculated from standard errors that are clustered at
the district level. Relative year 1 is omitted in order to make all estimates relative to the year
prior to unionization. I include a zero for the point estimate in relative year but lack j p 1,
of standard error bars reﬂect that this zero is imposed rather than estimated.
These results are at odds with the vast majority of teachers’ union
impact studies that ﬁnd a positive union wage premium (see Freeman
[1986] for an overview). Hoxby’s (1996) estimate of 5.1% is also outside
the 95% conﬁdence interval estimated here for all but the last 2 years of
the event window. Second, although there is evidence in the literature that
the union wage premium increased substantially over the 1970s (Baugh
and Stone 1982; Freeman 1986), no such increase appears in ﬁgure 4.
25
Over time, as the union position became more solidiﬁed in these school
districts, there is no statistically signiﬁcant evidence that they achieved
wage gains for their members.
Results for full-time teacher employment are shown in ﬁgure 5. They
suggest that employment increases immediately following unionization
by close to 5% and remains at this level over time. The majority of the
25 The explanation commonly given for this increase is that, in the earlier years
of the teacher unionization movement, unions were focused on gaining a foothold
in the district rather than on wage gains. As unions became more accepted over the
course of the 1970s, they turned their attention to obtaining wage increases for their
constituents.546 Lovenheim
Fig. 5.—The effect of teachers’ unions on log full-time teacher employment. The points
represent coefﬁcient estimates from estimation of eq. (2) on the 1972–91 Census/Survey of
Governments data, as described in the text. The bars extending from each point show the
bounds of the 95% conﬁdence interval calculated from standard errors that are clustered at
the district level. Relative year 1 is omitted in order to make all estimates relative to the year
prior to unionization. I include a zero for the point estimate in relative year but lack j p 1,
of standard error bars reﬂect that this zero is imposed rather than estimated.
post-election estimates are statistically distinguishable from zero at the
5% level. These results are consistent with a model of union behavior in
which teachers bargain over class size, preparatory time, and noninstruc-
tional supervision responsibilities, causing more teachers to be hired.
26
Despite the increase in teacher employment, ﬁgure 6 illustrates that
winning a unionization election has little effect on student-teacher ratios;
while all point estimates for are negative, none are statistically sig- j 1 0
niﬁcant. The explanation for the seemingly contradictory resultsinﬁgures
5 and 6 is that student enrollment increases after unionization. I estimated
equation (2) using log student enrollment as the dependent variable; these
results are presented in ﬁgure 8. I ﬁnd that enrollment is unaffected in
the ﬁrst 2 years following unionization but that it then increases to about
5% over the next 3 years and remains at this level for the remainder of
the event window. Thus, teacher employment increases immediately upon
unionization, but within 4 years after certiﬁcation, enrollment expansion
26 Figure 5 also could be evidence of a principal-agent model in which the union
representatives seek to maximize union dues by forcing the district to hire more
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Fig. 6.—The effect of teachers’ unions on log student-teacher ratios. The points represent
coefﬁcient estimates from estimation of eq. (2) on the 1972–91 Census/Survey ofGovernments
data, as described in the text. The bars extending from each point show the bounds of the
95% conﬁdence interval calculated from standard errors that are clustered at the district level.
Relative year 1 is omitted in order to make all estimates relative to the year prior to union-
ization. I include a zero for the point estimate in relative year but lack of standard j p 1,
error bars reﬂect that this zero is imposed rather than estimated.
in treated districts, relative to control districts, undoes the decline in class
sizes that would occur from increased teacher employment.
27 Importantly,
there is little evidence of relative pre-unionization trendsinﬁgure8,which
suggests that this result is not being driven by selection into unionization
based on recent enrollment patterns.
Unlike private sector unions, public sector unions can try to inﬂuence
the total amount of resources available as well as their share of resources
(Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld 1979; Freeman 1986); through polit-
ical lobbying and public relations, teachers’ unions can increase the pro-
vision of public education.
28 Figure 7 examines this possibility by ana-
lyzing the effect of teachers’ unions on log real COE per student. There
27 Note that most districts in the three states are losing population over this time
period. The enrollment change is due to slower net out-migration rather than faster
net in-migration in unionized districts relative to nonunion districts (see ﬁg. B3).
28 Interestingly, this is one area where the administration and the teachers’ union
might agree. One explanation for the acquiescence of school boards to teachers’
unionization might be that the administration hopes to increase provision of public
education through the union’s political actions.548 Lovenheim
Fig. 7.—Theeffectofteachers’unionsonlogrealcurrentoperatingexpendituresperstudent.
The points represent coefﬁcient estimates from estimation of eq. (2) on the 1972–91 Census/
Survey of Governments data, as described in the text. The bars extending from each point
show the bounds of the 95% conﬁdence interval calculated from standard errors that are
clustered at the district level. Relative year 1 is omitted in order to make all estimates relative
to the year prior to unionization. I include a zero for the point estimate in relative year j p
but lack of standard error bars reﬂect that this zero is imposed rather than estimated. 1,
is considerable variation in the estimates: the ﬁrst year post-unionization
shows a positive and signiﬁcant spike in COE per student of about 4%,
after which the estimates become negative and remain close to zero for
the remainder of the event window. Furthermore, ﬁgure 7 shows some
variation in relative pre-treatment trends, but examination of ﬁgure 3
suggests that these differences are more likely due to noise in the data
than that they indicate selection on relative trends in per student current
operating expenditures. Note that this ﬁgure represents changes in per
student expenditures. As enrollment is increasing by about 5% over this
period in unionized districts relative to control districts,totalexpenditures
do increase, though not enough to keep up with the enrollment increases.
One interpretation of ﬁgure 7 is that teachers’ unions successfully guard
against per student expenditure losses in the face of rising relative en-
rollment. However, an equally plausible interpretation is that unions have
little effect, especially in the long run, on this outcome.
2. Robustness Checks
As discussed in Section III.B, the critical assumption underlying iden-
tiﬁcation of the g coefﬁcients in equation (2) is the use of an appropriateEffect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 549
Fig. 8.—The effect of teachers’ unions on log student enrollment. The points represent
coefﬁcient estimates from estimation of eq. (2) on the 1972–1991 Census/Survey of Govern-
ments data, as described in the text. The bars extending from each point show the bounds of
the 95% conﬁdence interval calculated from standard errors that are clustered at the district
level. Relative year 1 is omitted in order to make all estimates relative to the year prior to
unionization. I include a zero for the point estimate inrelative year butlackofstandard j p 1,
error bars reﬂect that this zero is imposed rather than estimated.
control group to account for secular variation in school district resources.
Recall that ﬁgures 2 and 3, as well as ﬁgures B1–B3, suggest that my
estimates should not be particularly sensitive to the within-state nonunion
districts I use as a control group because yearly trends are very similar
across districts that unionized at different times and across districts that
never unionized and those that did. Nonetheless, I assess the fragility of
my results to the choice of estimation sample by estimating equation (2)
using additional samples that each imply a different control group. First,
I restrict the estimation sample to include only never-unionized districts
and the district-year observations for which the relative time to certiﬁ-
cation falls within the event window. The control group implied by this
estimation sample is composed of only the never-unionized districts and
is attractive relative to the control group used to generate the main es-
timates because the proportion of districts that do unionize and never
unionize is not changing over time. Furthermore, this control group will
be unaffected by union effects on the dependent variable more than 5
years prior to unionization. I also obtain estimates using only those dis-
trict-year observations for which the relative time to unionization is less550 Lovenheim
than or equal to 10. This sample is the same as the one used to estimate
the parameters shown in ﬁgures 4–8, but it excludes never-unionized
districts. The implied control group is thus the district-year observations
for which the relative time to certiﬁcation is less than 5.
In order to summarize these estimates, I estimate regressions on each
sample that include a linear term for relative union age (including negative
ages), which is set to zero for never-unionized districts, a union status
dummy variable equal to one if the district is unionized in a given year,
and an interaction between union status and yearsrelativetounionization.
This model is a form of equation (2) in which I constrain the relative pre-
and post-unionization trends to be linear.
29 As expected, estimates from
these robustness checks are very similar in both magnitude and quality
to those presented in Section III.C.1 and are shown in table 3.
Another way to identify union effects is to control directly for pre-
treatment trends of districts that unionize.
30 Results from such a model
are presented in table 4, in which the analysis sample is all district-year
observations with relative years to union election less than 11. I control
for both year and district ﬁxed effects as well as a linear measureofrelative
union age. Due to the exclusion of districts that do not unionize and of
district-year observations with union ages greater than 10 years, the linear
union age coefﬁcient controls for pre-union trends in outcomes among
districts that will unionize in the future. These estimates should be un-
affected by union threat effects, but they will not be consistent for the
ATT if there are secular trends in the dependent variable that are spuri-
ously correlated with union timing.
The results are consistent in both magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance
to those presented in ﬁgures 4–8. In particular, I ﬁnd little evidence of a
union effect on teachers’ wages and student-teacher ratios in the short
run or the long run. While the estimated effects on teacher employment
are somewhat smaller than the estimates in ﬁgure 5, they are positive and
qualitatively similar. The estimates for current operating expenditures per
student are consistent with those in ﬁgure 7 directly after unionization,
but they suggest a potential negative longer-run effect. Finally, table 4
shows a similar enrollment effect to theestimatesinﬁgure8.Thesimilarity
of these results to those reported in Section III.C.1 suggests that union
threat effects are not biasing my identiﬁcation of the effect of teachers’
unions on school district resources and that unions have little effect on
school district resource allocation. However, if unions inﬂuence teacher
29 Estimates of the g coefﬁcients, estimated using eq. (2) on these samples, are
available from the author upon request.
30 Note that controlling for pre-treatment trends of districts that unionized is akin
to a ﬁrst-difference model, rather than the difference-in-difference model given by
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Table 3
Fixed Effects Estimates of Teachers’ Union Impacts on Resource Levels
from the Census/Survey of Governments Using Different Control Groups
Dependent Variable: Log of
Dependent
Variable
Real
Full-Time
Teacher Pay
Full-Time
Teacher
Employment
Student-
Teacher
Ratio
Real
COE per
Student
Total
Enrollment
A. Results Using Never-Unionized Districts as Control Group
Years relative to
unionization .003 .001 .001 .005 .000
(.005) (.009) (.010) (.006) (.004)
Union .013 .051** .012 .002 .032**
(.014) (.025) (.002) (.014) (.016)
Union # Years
relative to
unionization .005 .001 .022** .007 .005
(.005) (.009) (.010) (.007) (.005)
B. Results Using Late Unionized Districts as Control Group
Years relative to
unionization .005** .002 .026** .030** .017**
(.002) (.004) (.002) (.008) (.003)
Union .005 .044** .011 .005 .022
(.008) (.018) (.017) (.012) (.018)
Union # Years
relative to
unionization .001 .001 .002 .001 .004*
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Note.—The analysis sample in panel A includes only district-year observations with time to union-
ization less than or equal to 10 years and greater than 6 years, as well as never-unionized districts. The
analysis sample in panel B includes only district-year observations with time to unionization less than
or equal to 10 years, excluding never-unionized districts. The implicit control group in the panel B
regressions are district-year observations that unionize more than 5 years in the future in any calendar
year. Regressions include school district– and state-speciﬁc year ﬁxed effects. The variable years relative
to unionization is the number of years relative to election certiﬁcation, which includes negative values
for the 5 years prior to certiﬁcation. For districts that do not unionize and for district-year observations
that unionize more than 5 years in the future, years relative to unionization is set to zero. The variable
union is a dummy variable equal to one if a district has successfully unionized as of that calendar year.
All standard errors are clustered at the school district level and are shown in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
productivity, they still can affect student achievement. I next turn to an
empirical analysis of the effect of unions on high school dropout rates to
test for such effects.
D. The Effect of Teachers’ Unions on High School Dropout Rates
In order to test whether teachers’ unions affect educational attainment
among students, I estimate linear education production functions using
high school dropout rates as my outcome measure. This analysis therefore
will be focused on those at the lower end of the educational attainment
distribution. Because the high school dropout rate is calculated from 1970,
1980, and 1990 school district-level U.S. Census data (see Sec. II.B), ITable 4
Fixed Effects Estimates of Teachers’ Union Impacts on Resource Levels
from the Census/Survey of Governments Controlling for Pre-Treatment
Trends
Dependent
Variable
Dependent Variable: Log of
Real
Full-Time
Teacher Pay
Full-Time
Teacher
Employment
Student-
Teacher
Ratio
Real
COE per
Student
Total
Enrollment
Years relative to
unionization .004** .008** .022** .022** .015**
(.001) (.003) (.002) (.001) (.002)
Union age:
0 years .005 .016 .013 .037** .003
(.017) (.012) (.010) (.013) (.011)
1 year .002 .017 .014 .018 .003
(.008) (.014) (.011) (.015) (.012)
2 years .007 .012 .018 .014 .015
(.010) (.017) (.014) (.032) (.017)
3 years .023** .017 .001 .004 .015
(.011) (.019) (.014) (.013) (.019)
4 years .000 .023 .000 .002 .024
(.012) (.021) (.014) (.013) (.020)
5 years .012 .030 .015 .003 .030
(.012) (.022) (.016) (.014) (.021)
6 years .000 .020 .004 .033** .042*
(.013) (.024) (.017) (.015) (.022)
7 years .018 .022 .014 .057** .046**
(.015) (.029) (.021) (.017) (.023)
8 years .004 .032 .001 .034** .050**
(.016) (.029) (.019) (.017) (.024)
9 years .042* .072** .021 .002 .048*
(.016) (.031) (.021) (.017) (.026)
10 years .012 .004 .002 .004 .043
(.017) (.032) (.021) (.018) (.027)
Constant 8.195** 4.611** 2.793** 8.438** 7.136**
(.007) (.014) (.037) (.009) (.010)
F-test of no
union effect 10.21 6.92 .89 8.70 1.78
[.00] [.00] [.55] [.00] [.05]
N 7,518 7,518 7,078 10,250 10,703
No. of clusters 1,027 1,027 1,027 1,027 1,027
R
2 .711 .975 .615 .566 .983
Note.—The analysis sample includes only district-year observations with time to unionization less
than or equal to 10 years. Regressions include school district and year ﬁxed effects. The variable years
relative to unionization is the number of years relative to election certiﬁcation, which includes negative
values for years prior to certiﬁcation. All standard errors are clustered at the school district level and
are shown in parentheses. The F-test of no union effect is a test for joint signiﬁcance of the union age
dummy coefﬁcients. The p-values of the test for joint signiﬁcance are presented in brackets beneath the
F-statistic.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.Effect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 553
cannot employ the difference-in-difference methodology given by equa-
tion (2) due to the fact there are relative years to union election with few
observations. Instead, I impose a linear structure on the time pattern of
teacher union effects, though results are unchanged if I allow for quadratic
time patterns. I estimate linear education production functions of the
form:
Dropout Rate p b  b Union 01 ist
 b Union # (Years relative to unionization) 2 ist
 b (Years relative to unionization) (4) 3 ist
 dX  t  f   , ist i st ist
where all union variables are deﬁned the same as in table 3 (see Sec.
III.C.2),
31 X is a vector of demographic characteristics that are listed in
Section II.B, and all other variables are as previously deﬁned.
32 The co-
efﬁcient on identiﬁes the ex- Union # (Years relative to unionization)ist
istence and magnitude of time-varying union effects on high school drop-
out rates, while the coefﬁcient on will detect Years relative to unionization
selection into unionization based on high school dropout rate trends.
Results from estimation of equation (4) are presented in table 5. When
the union age terms are excluded, there is no apparent effect of teachers’
unions on high school dropout rates: the coefﬁcient on the union dummy
is 0.100 and is not statistically signiﬁcant at even the 10% level. However,
when union age is added to the model, column 2 shows that unionization
is associated with a 1.8 percentage point increase in high school dropout
rates in the short run but in the long run is associated with a decrease in
dropout rates. The estimates imply that after 7.7 years the union effect
on dropout rates becomes negative. As column 3 shows, this result is
basically unchanged by controlling for union age prior to unionization,
which suggests that selection effects are negligible in this context.
The results presented in table 5 are suggestive that unions do not affect
high school dropout rates, at least on average. As discussed in Section I,
unions likely change many of the aspects of the teacher-administrator
relationship, each of which has a different implication for teacher pro-
31 In eq. (4) and table 4, the variableyearsrelativetounionizationincludesnonzero
values for all negative union ages, whereas in table 3, years relative to unionization
is set to zero for all values less than 5.
32 The education production function given by (4) is admittedly crude in the sense
that I am unable to control for student-level factors such as previous test scores
and a vector of historical educational inputs. This limitation is necessitated by the
data, but under the assumption that unionization is conditionally exogenous, which
has been the identifying assumption throughout the analysis, the exercise still yields
insight into the relationship between teachers’ unions and high school dropout rates.554 Lovenheim
Table 5
Effect of Teachers’ Unions on High School Dropout Rates, 1970–90
Independent Variable
Dependent Variable: High School
Dropout Rate in Percent
(1) (2) (3)
Union .100 1.809* 2.103**
(.889) (.933) (1.058)
Union # (Years relative to unionization) .235** .190**
(.093) (.124)
Years relative to unionization .095
(.124)
Log population 23.482** 23.538** 23.557**
(3.624) (3.620) (3.610)
% Urban 1.633** 1.545** 1.517**
(.700) (.700) (.703)
Log Average income 13.861** 13.376** 13.326**
(3.216) (3.192) (3.190)
Log Median rent 2.338 2.207 2.125
(1.788) (1.779) (1.768)
% Below poverty .208** .194** .194**
(.100) (.099) (.099)
% Unemployed .050 .026 .025
(.099) (.099) (.099)
% Black .057 .138 .139
(.371) (.376) (.377)
% Hispanic .266 .317 .328
(.251) (.252) (.250)
% 12–15 years school .009 .022 .023
(.069) (.070) (.070)
%1 6  years school .263** .256** .258**
(.076) (.076) .076)
% Private enrollment .201** .208** .207**
(.088) (.087) (.088)
Log Public school enrollment 22.446** 22.483** 22.505**
(3.209) (3.194) (3.180)
Constant 18.693 19.441 19.237
(14.967) (15.131) (15.154)
Source.—Author’s calculation as described in the text from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 U.S. Census
School District Files.
Note.—The variable years relative to unionization is the number of years relative to election certi-
ﬁcation, which includes negative values for years prior to certiﬁcation. For districts that do not unionize,
years relative to unionization is set to zero. The variable union is a dummy variable equal to one if a
district has successfully unionized as of that calendar year. All models include state-by-year and school
district ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school district level and are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
ductivity. For example, by making it more difﬁcult to ﬁre teachers and
by linking pay to experience and education level instead of to output,
unions can reduce teacher productivity. However, unions can be pro-
ductivity enhancing by protecting teachers from bad administrative prac-
tices and giving them a voice with which to inﬂuence their workplace.
Table 5 is suggestive either that unions have no effect on productivity or
that the positive productivity effects of unionization are canceled out by
the negative effects. How teachers’ unions inﬂuence the effectiveness of
educational inputs is an important topic for future research.Effect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 555
IV. Discussion
Taken together, the results presented above indicate that teachers’
unions have little net effect on resource allocation and student educational
attainment. What theories of school district and union behavior might be
consistent with my ﬁndings? One model that ﬁts into the context of the
above results is Tiebout sorting (Tiebout 1956). Tiebout sorting could
occur due to the increases in teacher employment and current operating
expenditures per student directly after unionization. To the extent that
parents value these increased resource levels, enrollment in unionized
districts should increase relative to nonunionized districts, which is what
the data show. These results are thus consistent with the larger literature
on parental valuation of school resources (Black 1999; Brasington 1999).
Such studies typically present evidence that more school resources lead
to increased demand among parents as measured by changes in housing
prices. It is natural to expect increases in demand to lead to enrollment
increases as well.
That the relative enrollment increases found in my analysis are of the
same magnitude as the teacher employment effects and that they occur
gradually after the unionization decision is highly suggestive that they
are in response to the shift in resources post-unionization. Conversely,
unions may be reacting to expected relative enrollment increases in their
district to force the administration to keep class sizes and expenditures
per student roughly constant. Both models of union behaviorwillproduce
the data patterns reported in Section III. To test the latter explanation, I
use the age distribution in each school district from the 1980 U.S. Census
to explore whether the 0–5 age population in any given year has power
in predicting the timing of the unionization election. I ﬁnd no evidence
of correlation between union vote timing and forecastable population in
the school district. Furthermore, because the cities are more likely to
unionize, any macroeconomic shock that caused an increase in urban
versus rural population in the 1970s could explain the enrollment result.
Appendix ﬁgure B4 shows trends in log enrollment among urban and
rural districts for the three states in this study and for the 18 states without
duty-to-bargain laws.
33 The ﬁgure shows no evidence of enrollment shifts
in the nonunion states, but the rural districts in Iowa, Indiana, and Min-
nesota, which contain virtually all of the nonunionized districts, experi-
enced declining enrollment beginning in the mid-1970s relative to urban
districts. For a macroeconomic shock to explain this shift, it must be
occurring in these three states and not in the nonunion states.
I also estimate equation (2) using only rural districts. The results of
this exercise are reported in table B3 and are both qualitatively and quan-
33 Rural districts are those that have no census block points in an urban area at
any point in the sample period. The remainder of districts are classiﬁed as urban.556 Lovenheim
titatively similar to those presented above. The results therefore point to
a Tiebout sorting explanation for the relative enrollment increases in un-
ionized districts rather than evidence of selection into unionization based
on beliefs about future enrollment changes or growth in city versus rural
populations. That the relative enrollment increases in unionized districts
negates any class size and per student expenditure gains from rising em-
ployment and expenditure levels following unionization, however, is un-
ambiguous in the data.
Another explanation for my results is that teachers’ unions simply may
be ineffective at inﬂuencing resource allocation. This could occurifunions
face restrictive district budget constraints; if there are few rents to extract,
the unions will not be able to affect school district budgets regardless of
their underlying goals. Further, union aggressiveness in extracting rents
may be limited by a fear of taxpayer backlash at the local level. It remains
an open question in the literature whether teacher unionization causes
tax revolts, but unions may react to this possibility by reducing the degree
to which they attempt to inﬂuence educational inputs. Teachers’ unions
also may achieve nonsalary beneﬁts for teachers, such as health care and
pensions,
34 as well as give teachers a voice in setting work rules and
practices (Retsinas 1982; Murphy 1990; Moe 2001; Johnson 2004). While
the data on such outcomes are difﬁcult to obtain, examiningunionimpacts
on these factors is an important area for future work.
My union impact estimates differ both quantitatively and qualitatively
from much of the established literature on teachers’ union effects. One
plausible explanation for these differences is that unions have different
effects in Iowa, Indiana, and Minnesota than in the rest of the United
States. Another explanation, however, is that the union election data more
accurately capture the timing and extent of teacher unionization than
previous measures have. In order to gain insight into the differences be-
tween my estimates and previous estimates in the literature, appendix
table C1 compares my union measure with the union measure constructed
from the Census of Governments Labor Relations Surveys, used most
notably in Hoxby (1996). There are substantial differences across the two
measures that strongly suggest that measurement error exists in the COG
union measure. Interpreting all differences between theunion certiﬁcation
measure and the COG union measure as measurement error in the latter,
I ﬁnd misclassiﬁcation rates of up to 47% in the Census of Governments.
Appendix C also presents replications of the analysis from Hoxby
(1996) using my sample of three states and both union measures in order
to determine the relevance of the differences in union measures on union
34 Freeman (1986) cites evidence that public sector unions raise non-wage beneﬁts
by more than they raise wages, though the evidence is scant for teachers’ unions.
Freeman (1981) ﬁnds the same effect for private sector unions.Effect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 557
impact estimates. Although the results of this replication are somewhat
inconclusive due to large standard errors, my estimates using the COG
union measure, particularly for teacher pay, are consistent with those
presented in Hoxby (1996), but I ﬁnd that using my union measure pro-
duces substantively different estimates. I then undertake an analysis of
the properties of the measurement error in the COG union measure,
treating the election certiﬁcation data as the true measure of union status
for each school district. I ﬁnd that the measurement error in the Census
of Governments is correlated with the outcome variables used in this
analysis, which implies that the bias is not guaranteed to attenuate the
coefﬁcient estimatesbecauseitiscorrelatedwithteachersalary,perstudent
expenditure, class size, and high school dropout rate changes at the school
district level (Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz 2001). I also perform
Bound et al. (1994) decompositions that decompose the measurement
error into the part that is due to misclassiﬁcation of union status and the
part that is due to the correlation of this misclassiﬁcation with the re-
gression error. My results indicate that both forms of bias are present and
reinforce each other forteacherpay,COEperstudent,andstudent-teacher
ratios but work in opposite directions for high school dropout rates. The
central implication of the results presented in appendix C is that obtaining
accurate measures of union status and unionization timing is critical to
obtaining accurate estimates of union impacts.
V. Conclusion
Using new hand-collected data on the timing of teachers’ unionelection
certiﬁcations in Iowa, Indiana, and Minnesota combined with school dis-
trict-level data from the Census/Survey of Governments, I investigate the
impact of teachers’ unions on school district educational resources. Con-
trary to many past studies on teachers’ unions (Baugh and Stone 1982;
Freeman 1986; Moore and Raisian 1987; Hoxby 1996), I ﬁnd that unions
have no effect on teacher pay. I also present evidence that teacher union-
ization causes an increase in full-time teacher employment of about 5%,
a negligible decrease in student-teacher ratios, and only has a short-run
positive effect on current operating expenditures per student.
I estimate the impact of unions on high school dropout rates using
1970–1990 U.S. Census school district summary data and ﬁnd little evi-
dence that unions affect this outcome measure. However, I am unable to
determine with my data whether similar results would be found for other
achievement measures that include more students from higher portions
of the ability distribution.
The results and conclusions of this analysis raise a puzzle: why do
teachers bother to organize, especially at the high rates observed in the
data, given the lack of wage and class size effects? One possible answer558 Lovenheim
to this puzzle is that teachers perceive that organization increases their
pay. Indeed, when talking to union members during this study, wage
increases were the most commonly mentioned beneﬁt of unionization, in
contrast to what this analysis shows. Another important reason for un-
ionizing is to give teachers a voice with which to improve their working
conditions as well as to establish well-deﬁned rules governing hiring and
ﬁring, pay structure, and promotion. There is anecdotal evidenceteachers’
unions provide these beneﬁts (Woodbury 1985), although I lack the data
to test for such effects. Finally, unionization may increase nonwage ben-
eﬁts such as pensions or health care that are valued by teachers. Union-
ization thus can inﬂuence how satisﬁed teachers are with their job, and
consequently, may affect parent and student satisfaction with their school
district.
One must be careful in drawing too general a conclusion from the
results presented above, as this study includes only three states concen-
trated in the Midwest. Rather than interpreting my results as represen-
tative of union impacts for the United States as a whole, one can view
this study as provocative in suggesting the commonly accepted effects of
teachers’ unions—raising wages and reducing teacher productivity—may
not be robust to the use of more accurate union data.Themainimplication
of this study is more research using such data is necessary to understand
more fully the nature and impact of collective bargaining in public ed-
ucation and to inform meaningful labor relations policy.
Appendix A
Census and Survey of Governments
The Census of Governments (COG) has been conducted every 5 years
beginning in 1957; however, data only are available electronically starting
in 1972. The survey contains expenditure and employment data for every
independent government in the United States, including independent
school districts. Independent school districts are those deemed separate
enough from other local governments that they are considered their own
autonomous government. In Iowa and Indiana, all school districts are
independent. In Minnesota, however, about 7% of students are enrolled
in dependent school districts. Thus, the universe of school districts in the
COG/SOG is close to the full universe of school districts in the three
states included in this analysis.
The Survey of Governments (SOG) has been conducted in each non-
COG year beginning in 1973. It contains a random sample of local gov-
ernments included in the previous census. In1979,theCensusBureaubegan
sampling every school district in certain states (including Iowa and Min-
nesota) for their Annual Survey of Local Government Finances: SchoolEffect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 559
Systems (F-33). The employment survey, which is conducted separately,
remained a random sample for all states.
BecausetheCensusBureaudoesnotcodeschooldistrictsinasystematic
manner, the only way to combine information across years is to merge
ﬁles based on district name. However, in the 1975 ﬁnance ﬁle and the
1986 ﬁnance and employment ﬁles, these names are missing. Thus, I am
forced to exclude data from these survey years from the analysis. I do
use the 1975 employment data, however.
I construct measures of real monthly full-time teacher pay, full-time
teacher employment, student-teacher ratios, and current operating ex-
penditures (COE) for each district in the sample. All ﬁnancial variables
are inﬂated to real 2004 dollars using the CPI-U. The deﬁnitions of most
of these variables are straightforward and come directly from the COG/
SOG, with the exception of teacher pay and the student-teacher ratio.
I construct real monthly full-time teacher pay by dividing the gross
monthly payroll for full-time instructional staff by the number of full-
time instructional staff. Full-time staff are deﬁned by the number of hours
they are paid to work; both full-time and part-time teacher employment
include the same categories of staff members. Note also that, in the COG/
SOG data, “teachers” include educational support staff and school-level
administrators, such as principals and guidance counselors. However,
other administrators, such as the superintendent, are excluded from this
category. Unfortunately, there are no district-level data from this period
on teacher pay that will allow me to narrow this group further. To the
extent that unions affect the mix of full-time teachers in the school district
through changes in seniority rules and hiring practices, the impact on
teacher pay only will be detected if these changes shift the mean salary
of teachers.
The student-teacher ratio is my measure of class size (Woodbury [1985]
and Hoxby [1996] also use this measure). I calculate the student-teacher
ratio by dividing total enrollment by the number of full-time equivalent
teachers in each school district. While this ratio does not measure the
exact number of students included in each class, it is a reasonable and
standard approximation of the human resources per student in each
district.560
Appendix B
Supplemental Figures and Tables561
Fig. B1.—Trends in log full-time teacher employment by state. The data come from the
teachers’ union election certiﬁcation data and Census/Survey of Governments as described
in the text. In each panel, the vertical line represents the year in which a duty-to-bargain
law was passed in the state. “Never Unionize” districts are those that donot haveasuccessful
union election vote by 2004, “Early Unionize” districts are those that unionize prior to
passage of their state’s duty-to-bargain law, “Late Unionize” districts are those thatunionize
more than one year after passage of their state’s duty-to-bargain law, and “On-Time Un-
ionize” districts are those that unionize within 1 year of passage of their state’s duty-to-
bargain law. “Non Duty to Bargain States” are the 18 states that did not have a duty-to-
bargain law as of 1982: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas,
Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.562563
Fig. B2.—Trends in log student-teacher ratios by state. The data come from the teachers’
union election certiﬁcation data and Census/Survey of Governments, as described in the
text. In each panel, the vertical line represents the year in which a duty-to-bargain law was
passed in the state. “Never Unionize” districts are those that do not have a successful union
election vote by 2004, “Early Unionize” districts are those that unionize prior to passage
of their state’s duty-to-bargain law, “Late Unionize” districts are those that unionize more
than one year after passage of their state’s duty-to-bargain law, and “On-Time Unionize”
districts are those that unionize within 1 year of passage of their state’s duty-to-bargain
law. “Non Duty to Bargain States” are the 18 states that did not have a duty-to-bargain
law as of 1982: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Lou-
isiana, Missouri, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
West Virginia, and Wyoming.564565
Fig. B3.—Trends in log enrollment by state. The data come from the teachers’ union
election certiﬁcation data and Census/Survey of Governments, as described in the text. In
each panel, the vertical line represents the year in which a duty-to-bargain law was passed
in the state. “Never Unionize” districts are those that do not have a successful union election
vote by 2004, “Early Unionize” districts are those that unionize prior to passage of their
state’s duty-to-bargain law, “Late Unionize” districts are those that unionize more than 1
year after passage of their state’s duty-to-bargain law, and “On-Time Unionize” districts
are those that unionize within 1 year of passage of their state’s duty-to-bargain law. “Non
Duty to Bargain States” are the 18 states that did not have a duty-to-bargain law as of 1982:
Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and
Wyoming.566
Fig. B4.—Trends in log enrollment among union and nonunion states. The data come
from the teachers’ union election certiﬁcation data and Census/Survey of Governments, as
described in the text. Rural districts are those that do not have a Census block point in an
urban area at any time during the sample period. Urban districts comprise the remainder
of school districts. “Non Union States” are the 18 states that did not have a duty-to-bargain
law as of 1982: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Lou-
isiana, Missouri, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
West Virginia, and Wyoming.567
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Table B2
Fixed Effects Estimates of Teachers’ Union Impacts on Resource Levels
from the Census/Survey of Governments Using a Balanced Panel of
Districts That Are Observed in Every Year of the Sample
Relative
Years to
Union
Election
Dependent Variable: Log of
Real
Full-Time
Teacher Pay
Full-Time
Teacher
Employment
Student-Teacher
Ratio
Real
COE per
Student
Total
Enrollment
5 years .017 .029 .024 .153 .015
(.021) (.026) (.022) (.135) (.027)
4 years .038 .016 .002 .006 .018
(.032) (.027) (.016) (.032) (.026)
3 years .009 .012 .010 .014 .004
(.019) (.023) (.021) (.029) (.020)
2 years .010 .022 .019 .032 .042
(.017) (.023) (.028) (.028) (.028)
0 years .025 .029 .018 .076* .004
(.022) (.022) (.024) (.039) (.016)
1 year .023 .016 .005 .023 .005
(.023) (.027) (.027) (.039) (.021)
2 years .023 .021 .002 .081 .036
(.024) (.033) (.033) (.078) (.032)
3 years .027 .047 .012 .010 .043
(.025) (.036) (.026) (.031) (.039)
4 years .032 .045 .023 .026 .034
(.027) (.040) (.029) (.026) (.043)
5 years .021 .050 .015 .027 .048
(.030) (.044) (.030) (.027) (.050)
6 years .012 .067 .039 .034 .049
(.029) (.049) (.034) (.029) (.052)
7 years .026 .021 .013 .003 .042
(.030) (.054) (.039) (.035) (.058)
8 years .020 .035 .007 .012 .046
(.033) (.056) (.032) (.030) (.061)
9 years .019 .032 .002 .012 .031
(.036) (.059) (.036) (.033) (.059)
10 years .005 .019 .044 .043 .013
(.036) (.062) (.036) (.036) (.058)
Constant 8.225** 5.650** 2.565** 8.697** 8.226**
(.033) (.068) (.033) (.035) (.060)
N 3,683 3,684 3,474 3,835 4,047
No. clusters 213 213 213 213 213
R
2 .737 .964 .526 .590 .976
Note.—Regressions include school district– and state-speciﬁc year ﬁxed effects. All standard errors
are clustered at the school district level and are shown in parentheses. The analysis sample contains only
districts that are observed in every survey year and is composed of never-unionized districts and ob-
servations with relative years to union election less than 11. Relative year 1 is omitted to make all
estimates relative to the year prior to certiﬁcation.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.Table B3
Fixed Effects Estimates of Teachers’ Union Impacts on Resource Levels
from the Census/Survey of Governments—Rural Districts Only
Relative
Years to
Union
Election
Dependent Variable: Log of
Real
Full-Time
Teacher Pay
Full-Time
Teacher
Employment
Student-Teacher
Ratio
Real
COE per
Student
Total
Enrollment
5 years .027 .004 .009 .004 .001
(.018) (.038) (.056) (.012) (.014)
4 years .017 .020 .022 .006 .004
(.012) (.021) (.016) (.013) (.013)
3 years .006 .009 .009 .027** .010
(.011) (.019) (.016) (.014) (.014)
2 years .012 .021 .013 .004 .031**
(.011) (.020) (.018) (.014) (.014)
0 years .015 .049* .040 .039* .004
(.012) (.026) (.028) (.022) (.018)
1 year .011 .048** .032 .009 .003
(.012) (.023) (.021) (.015) (.019)
2 years .004 .045* .017 .017 .022
(.014) (.023) (.021) (.028) (.022)
3 years .013 .062** .017 .011 .035
(.014) (.024) (.021) (.014) (.023)
4 years .015 .063** .026 .003 .042*
(.014) (.026) (.024) (.014) (.024)
5 years .014 .052** .019 .002 .042*
(.014) (.026) (.023) (.015) (.024)
6 years .007 .071** .036 .015 .047**
(.014) (.027) (.026) (.016) (.024)
7 years .007 .058* .038 .004 .042*
(.016) (.033) (.031) (.018) (.023)
8 years .014 .068** .033 .004 .043*
(.016) (.034) (.030) (.016) (.024)
9 years .022 .074** .034 .002 .045
(.018) (.033) (.028) (.016) (.024)
10 years .023 .044 .032 .010 .031
(.017) (.030) (.026) (.018) (.026)
Constant 8.077** 4.266** 2.540** 8.198** 6.803**
(.023) (.033) (.037) (.015) (.016)
N 6,659 6,659 6,333 10,408 10,754
No. clusters 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005
R
2 .695 .965 .622 .933 .979
Note.—Regressions include school district– and state-speciﬁc year ﬁxed effects. All standard errors
are clustered at the school district level and are shown in parentheses. The analysis sample contains only
districts without a census block in an urban area in any year and is composed of never-unionized districts
and observations with relative years to union election less than 11. Relative year 1 is omitted to make
all estimates relative to the year prior to certiﬁcation.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.Effect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 571
Appendix C
Classiﬁcation Error in the Constructed Census of Governments
Teachers’ Union Measure
1. A Comparison of Alternative Unionization Measures
As discussed in Section IV in the main text, my union impact estimates
differ substantially from those in the established literature. In order to
understand these differences more fully, it is instructive ﬁrst to compare
my union election certiﬁcation data and the union measure constructed
from the Census of Governments Labor Relations Survey (COG) used
in Hoxby (1996), as this is the only other available district-level panel
data union measure. The COG does not directly ask respondents about
the existence of a teachers’ union or a contract with that union. Instead,
it contains three survey items related to labor relations that can be used
to infer union status in a district:
1. Total number of full-time teachers who are members of an em-
ployee organization.
2. Does your agency engage in collective negotiations or meet and
confer discussions with employee organizations for the purpose of
reaching agreement on conditions of employment?
3. Total number of contractual agreements between your agency and
employee organizations in effect as of October 15 of the survey
year.
From these survey responses, one can construct a unionization measure
using the following criteria: at least 50% of teachers are union members,
the form of labor negotiations is collective bargaining, and the district
has at least one contract or memorandum of understanding with any
employee organization in effect as of October of the survey year. Note
that this union measure is appropriately designed to identify teacher con-
tracts that are collectively bargained with a school district rather than a
contract with other employee unions.
While the above measure is the most sensible alternative in the COG,
it has several drawbacks. The ﬁrst is that it effectively measures whether
a district has a collectively bargained contract with the teachers’ union,
not whether a teachers’ union exists. Given the short lag between certi-
ﬁcation and negotiation of a ﬁrst contract, however,thisdiscrepancylikely
is small.
The second and more serious problem is classiﬁcation errorintheCOG
union measure. Although the COG-based union measure is designed to
reduce potential measurement error by making the deﬁnition of union-
ization relatively strict, there are signiﬁcant differences between the COG
and election certiﬁcation measures of union status, which suggests that
measurement error exists in the former data. Table C1 contains a com-572 Lovenheim
Table C1
A Comparison of Union Status from the Census of Governments and the
Union Election Certiﬁcations by State and Year
Election Certi-
ﬁcation Union
Measure
Census of Governments Union Measure
Iowa Indiana Minnesota
Union Nonunion Union Nonunion Union Nonunion
1972 (%):
Union .00 .67 3.63 1.98 53.58 17.78
Nonunion 5.99 93.35 10.23 84.16 19.40 9.24
1977 (%):
Union 49.89 14.19 57.43 22.77 55.89 20.79
Nonunion 9.31 26.61 11.55 8.25 16.17 7.16
1982 (%):
Union 51.22 17.96 55.12 26.73 58.20 22.17
Nonunion 8.43 22.39 8.58 9.57 13.16 6.47
1987 (%):
Union 46.78 25.28 42.24 40.59 64.67 16.86
Nonunion 9.76 18.18 6.60 10.56 13.63 4.85
No. of districts 435 297 431
Source.—Author’s calculations from the 1972, 1977, 1982, and 1987 Census of Governments and the
teachers’ union election certiﬁcation data, described in the text.
Note.—The number of districts represents the total number of districts in the sample in 1987.
parison of district-level unionization rates from the COG and the election
certiﬁcations for each state in the sample. I constructed the COG measure
by a straightforward implementation of the above deﬁnition of unioni-
zation. Note that the COG is conducted every 5 years and therefore that
labor relations information was only included in the 1972, 1977, 1982,
and 1987 surveys.
Table C1 illustrates the substantial differences between the two union
measures. In the table, each four-cellsquaresumstoone,andeachdiagonal
within a cell represents the observations for which the union measures
agree. For example, in Iowa in 1977, the COG and the election certiﬁ-
cation measures agree that 49.89% of school districts were unionized and
26.61% were not. However, 9.31% of the school districts are classiﬁed
as unionized by the COG measure but had not successfully completed
a teachers’ union election by that date. Conversely, 14.19% of districts
had completed an election but were measured as not unionized by the
constructed COG union measure.
I interpret the disagreement between the two data sources as measure-
ment error, with true union status measured by the election certiﬁcations.
Given that there was little voluntary recognition occurring in these states
in this period and that the validation study made every attempt to ﬁnd
such districts, measurement error in the COG is a natural explanation
for why there are districts that had not completed a unionization election
yet were measured as unionized by the COG. Further, since mostdistricts
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cation and successfully negotiating a contract cannot explain why somany
districts that had certiﬁed unions were not measured as unionized by the
COG.
The accuracy of the COG unionization construct also is called into
question by the differential time trends in union status within statesacross
measures. Because there are no decertiﬁcations, unionization as measured
by election certiﬁcations weakly increases over time. Thus, conditional
on completing a successful election, a district always will be classiﬁed as
unionized. In contrast, after 1977, unionization rates decline over time in
the COG: while 788 districts were measured as unionized by the COG
in 1977, this number fell to 771 districts in 1982 and to 742 districts in
1987. These declines are not consistent with the lack of any evidence of
decertiﬁcation or cessation of collective bargaining in this time period in
these three states.
To investigate further the source of the discrepancy, I look at which of
the three criteria used in the COG union measure “fail” when a district
has completed a successful unionization election but is not classiﬁed as
unionized in the COG. I ﬁnd for such districts in all three states the
provision that the percentage of teachers who are union members must
be greater than 50 fails at higher rates over time. It is likely that this
variable constitutes the main source of measurement error in the COG
union measure. First, the COG is ﬁlled out by district administrators,
who may not know how many teachers are union members.
35 Second,
even if the union membership rate were accurately measured, Iowa, In-
diana, and Minnesota are agency shop states, meaning that employees are
covered by the contract and must pay union dues even when they are
not union members. That union membership is reducing over time in
these states thus creates measurement error in the COG-based union
measure, but this decline in membership, even if accurate, has not trans-
lated into changes in collective bargaining status. The problems surround-
ing the measurement of teacher union membership in the COG are the
main source of measurement error in the COG union measure.
Another potential source of measurement error is that an increasing
number of districtsreport havingnonegotiatedcontractsovertimedespite
the fact that, conditional on obtaining a ﬁrst contract, it is rare that the
teachers are ever without a negotiated contract with the district.
36 Some
of this discrepancy could be due to the fact that, even if a contract expires,
teachers typically continue to work under that contract until a new one
35 As correctly noted by a referee, many school districts will have information
on union membership because they deduct union dues from teacher paychecks.
However, there is enough year-to-year noise in the data to suggest that at least some
school districts are not accurately reporting union membership.
36 While there are no available credible aggregate statistics on this assertion, law-
yers I have spoken to at both the AFT and NEA agree with this generalization.574 Lovenheim
Table C2
Misclassiﬁcation Rates in the Census of Governments by State
and Year, Treating the Election Certiﬁcations as the True
Measure of Union Status (Percent)
Year Iowa Indiana Minnesota Average
1972 6.65 12.21 37.18 19.21
1977 23.50 34.32 36.95 31.17
1982 26.39 35.33 35.33 31.93
1987 35.03 47.19 30.48 36.48
Source.—Author’s calculations from the 1972, 1977, 1982, and 1987 Census of Gov-
ernments and the teachers’ union election certiﬁcation data, described in the text.
Note.—The misclassiﬁcation rate is the sum of the total number of times the Census
of Governments and the election certiﬁcation union measures disagree for each state and
year. Each state-level misclassiﬁcation rate is calculated by taking the sum of the off-
diagonal entries from the appropriate four-cell square in table C1. The average misclas-
siﬁcation rate is a weighted average of the state-level misclassiﬁcation rates, where the
weight is the number of school districts in each state and year.
is negotiated with the district. One explanation for the decrease in union-
ization rates apparent in the COG is that expired contracts are coded as
“no contract” despite the fact that negotiated work rules and wage sched-
ules are in place in these districts.Theseresultsprovidesuggestiveevidence
that the measure of the existence of contracts in the COG contains mea-
surement error.
37
Taking the election certiﬁcation data as the truemeasureofunionization
status, table C2 reports the misclassiﬁcation rates by state and year in the
COG. Aside from 1972, the average misclassiﬁcation rate remains rela-
tively constant at between 31% and 36% in the sample. However, the
misclassiﬁcation rate is as high as 47.2% in Indiana in 1987. Saltzman
(1985) provides some outside validation for these misclassiﬁcation rates.
He validates the1977 COGunion measurefor1,000districtsintheUnited
States and ﬁnds a misclassiﬁcation rate of 30% for the United States,
which is similar to the 31% misclassiﬁcation rate I report for my sample
of three states in that year.
2. The Effect of Different Union Measures on
Union Impact Estimates
The high misclassiﬁcation rates from the union measure constructed
from the COG suggest that this measure does not accurately characterize
the history and state of collective bargaining in the school districts in the
sample. In order to understand more fully the differences between my
37 Given the errors in the COG labor relations data, one must be skeptical of the
accuracy of the ﬁnancial and employment information in these surveys as well.
However, since the survey is ﬁlled out by the central administrative ofﬁces that
have access to payroll records and budgets, it is reasonable to expect that such data
will be supplied with greater accuracy than the number of teachers belonging to
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results and those from the existing literature, I undertake a comparison
of union impact estimates using the two available district-level union
measures. Speciﬁcally, I replicate estimates from Hoxby (1996) using both
union measures because it is the most comprehensive and empirically
sophisticated study of teachers’ unions in the literature and because our
studies use similar data and time periods.
The empirical speciﬁcations in Hoxby (1996) are of the form:
Y p b  b U  dX  t  f  w * t   , (C1) it 01 it it i t i it
where is an outcome variable of interest, is an indicator variable YU it it
equal to one if district i is unionized at time t, is a vector of the Xit
demographic characteristics listed in Section II.B in the main text, are ti
district ﬁxed effects, are year ﬁxed effects, are district-speciﬁc fw * t ti
linear time trends, and is a normally distributed error term. it
Tables C3–C5 present the results of the regressions when is, alter- Y it
natively, log real teacher pay, log real current operating expenditures per
student, and student-teacher ratios, as these are the dependent variables
analyzed by Hoxby. Each regression contains 3 years of data from the
1970, 1980, and 1990 U.S. Census school district ﬁles combined with the
1972, 1982, and 1987 COG data, described in Section II.B. Column 1 in
tables C3–C5 presents the results taken directly from Hoxby (1996). Col-
umn 2 contains estimates using Hoxby’s methodology on my sample of
three states and allows me to determine how much of the difference in
our estimates is due to the fact that I use only three states and she uses
all districts in the United States. Column 3 is identical to column 2, except
unionization is measured using the election certiﬁcation data. This last
column thus will yield insight into the effect of the measurement error
on union impact estimates.
Hoxby identiﬁes union effects by using only within-state variation
through the use of district ﬁxed effects and by an instrumental variables
(IV) strategy that uses only cross-state variation over time in collective
bargaining laws. As I only have data for three states, I am restricted to a
within-state analysis. While this restriction is justiﬁed by my more ac-
curate union data and the lack of evidence of union threat effects, as
discussed in Section III.A, I only will compare my results to the within-
state estimates from Hoxby (1996).
Changing the unionization measure has a large impact on estimates of
union effects in all three tables. In table C3, the union impact estimates
on log real teacher pay using the COG union measure are similar in
magnitude, sign, and statistical signiﬁcance for the national sample and
the Midwest sample. However, when I employ the election certiﬁcation
deﬁnition of unionization, the coefﬁcient on the union variable becomes
negative, smaller in magnitude, and not statistically signiﬁcant at even the
10% level. Note that the standard error on the union coefﬁcient increases576 Lovenheim
Table C3
Comparison of the Effect of Different Union Measures and Estimation
Samples on Estimates of the Union Impact on Teacher Pay
Independent Variable
Dependent Variable:
Ln (Real Monthly Average Teacher Pay)
COG/Hoxby (1996) Election Certiﬁcation
U.S.
Estimation
Sample
(1)
IA, IN, and
MN Estimation
Sample
(2)
IA, IN, and
MN Estimation
Sample
(3)
Union .051** .054** .019
(.008) (.024) (.072)
Log Population .015** .029 .029
(.004) (.063) (.057)
% Urban .0005** .0004 .0003
(.0002) (.0007) (.0007)
Log Average income .199** .066 .049
(.022) (.186) (.187)
Log Median rent .021** .064 .078
(.010) (.103) (.107)
% Below poverty .0001 .009 .009
(.0006) (.006) (.007)
% Unemployed .003** .009* .009*
(.001) (.005) (.005)
% Black .004** .0001 .002
(.001) (.010) (.009)
% Hispanic .004** .002 .001
(.001) (.010) (.011)
% 12–15 years school .00* .002 .004
(.0003) (.004) (.004)
%1 6  years school .004** .005 .007
(.0004) (.005) (.005)
% Private enrollment .001** .003 .004
(.0002) (.004) (.004)
Log Public school enrollment .041** .050 .053
(.002) (.057) (.057)
R
2 NR .9366 .9337
Source.—Estimates in col. 1 come from Hoxby (1996, table IV, col. 6). Col. 2 contains estimates using
the COG-based union measure on the IA, IN, and MN sample. Col. 3 presents estimates using the
election certiﬁcation union data on the IA, IN, and MN sample. Estimates in cols. 2 and 3 are calculated
from the 1972, 1982, and 1987 Census of Governments; the 1970, 1980, and 1990 U.S. Census; and the
teachers’ union election certiﬁcation data, described in the text.
Note.—Hoxby (1996) uses median household income, whereas I use mean household income because
median household income is not included in the 1970 Census school districtsummaryﬁles.Allregressions
include district and year ﬁxed effects as well as district-speciﬁc linear time trends. Standard errors are
clustered at the district level and are shown in parentheses. NR p not relevant.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
by a factor of three between columns 2 and 3 in table C3. This increase
occurs because there is variation in the COG measure that is due to
measurement error and is correlated with the dependent variable (see Sec.
C3). Eliminating this variation increases the standard error estimate sub-
stantially. While the union estimate in column 3 does not allow one to
rule out the verity of the union estimate in column 1, it illustrates the
fragility of the estimate to correcting for measurement error.Effect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 577
Table C4
Comparison of the Effect of Different Union Measures and Estimation
Samples on Estimates of the Union Impact on Current Operating
Expenditures per Student
Independent Variable
Dependent Variable:
Ln (Real Current Operating Expenditure per Student)
COG/Hoxby (1996) Election Certiﬁcation
U.S.
Estimation
Sample
(1)
IA, IN, and
MN Estimation
Sample
(2)
IA, IN, and
MN Estimation
Sample
(3)
Union .029** .017 .010
(.007) (.017) (.064)
Log Population .029** .013 .013
(.004) (.068) (.068)
% Urban .001** .0004 .0004
(.0001) (.0007) (.0007)
Log Average income .116** .146 .151
(.019) (.149) (.150)
Log Median rent .232** .032 .027
(.008) (.105) (.106)
% Below poverty .007 .009* .009*
(.001) (.005) (.005)
% Unemployed .005** .006 .006
(.001) (.004) (.005)
% Black .005** .005 .004
(.001) (.006) (.005)
% Hispanic .003** .005 .005*
(.001) (.008) (.009)
% 12–15 years school .005** .0001 .001
(.001) (.003) (.003)
%1 6  years school .004** .007 .008*
(.001) (.005) (.005)
% Private enrollment .003** .001 .001
(.001) (.003) (.003)
Log Public school enrollment .409** .024 .025
(.011) (.031) (.030)
R
2 NR .9661 .9660
Source.—Estimates in col. 1 come from Hoxby (1996, table III, col. 6). Col. 2 contains estimates
using the COG-based union measure on the IA, IN, and MN sample. Col. 3 presents estimates using
the election certiﬁcation union data on the IA, IN, and MN sample. Estimates in cols. 2 and 3 are
calculated from the 1972, 1982, and 1987 Census of Governments; the 1970, 1980, and 1990 U.S. Census;
and the teachers’ union election certiﬁcation data, described in the text.
Note.—Hoxby (1996) uses median household income, whereas I use mean household income because
median household income is not included in the 1970 Census school districtsummaryﬁles.Allregressions
include district and year ﬁxed effects as well as district-speciﬁc linear time trends. Standard errors are
clustered at the district level and are shown in parentheses. NR p not relevant.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
A similar pattern emerges in table C4, which presents resultsforcurrent
operating expenditures per student. Switching from the national to the
Midwest sample reduces the magnitude of the union coefﬁcient, but the
signs are the same across columns 1 and 2. However, in column 3, the
union impact estimate becomes negative when I use the election certiﬁ-
cation measure and the standard error increases by a factor of 3.8. Table578 Lovenheim
Table C5
Comparison of the Effect of Different Union Measures and Estimation
Samples on Estimates of the Union Impact on Student-Teacher Ratios
Independent Variable
Dependent Variable: Student-Teacher Ratio
COG/Hoxby (1996) Election Certiﬁcation
U.S.
Estimation
Sample
(1)
IA, IN, and
MN Estimation
Sample
(2)
IA, IN, and
MN Estimation
Sample
(3)
Union 1.112** .117 .189
(.338) (.547) (.836)
Log Population .841** 1.154 1.158
(.071) (2.618) (2.604)
% Urban .029** .020 .020
(.003) (.015) (.014)
Log Average income 1.170** 4.698 4.660
(.367) (4.100) (4.150)
Log Median rent 1.167** .024 .056
(.161) (2.519) (2.483)
% Below poverty .149 .038 .039
(.012) (.136) (.137)
% Unemployed .123** .101 .102
(.015) (.103) (.103)
% Black .143** .285 .286
(.012) (.478) (.455)
% Hispanic .065** .162 .161
(.014) (.233) (.225)
% 12–15 years school .129** .071 .067
(.011) (.098) (.105)
%1 6  years school .082** .165 .162
(.015) (.154) (.161)
% Private enrollment .098** .250 .249
(.009) (.344) (.345)
Log Public school enrollment 7.334** 2.990 2.997
(.217) (4.769) (4.745)
R
2 NR .9612 .9612
Source.—Estimates in col. 1 come from Hoxby (1996, table V, col. 6). Col. 2 contains estimates using
the COG-based union measure on the IA, IN, and MN sample. Col. 3 presents estimates using the
election certiﬁcation union data on the IA, IN, and MN sample. Estimates in cols. 2 and 3 are calculated
from the 1972, 1982, and 1987 Census of Governments; the 1970, 1980, and 1990 U.S. Census; and the
teachers’ union election certiﬁcation data, described in the text.
Note.—Hoxby (1996) uses median household income, whereas I use mean household income because
median household income is not included in the 1970 Census school districtsummaryﬁles.Allregressions
include district and year ﬁxed effects as well as district-speciﬁc linear time trends. Standard errors are
clustered at the district level and are shown in parentheses. NR p not relevant.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
C5 is more problematic because there is a marked difference between the
estimates in the ﬁrst two columns; the union impact on student-teacher
ratios in the three midwestern states is of a different sign than for the
nation as a whole. However, the difference in union coefﬁcients and the
increase in the size of the standard error of these coefﬁcients between
columns 2 and 3 in table C5 is consistent with the sensitivity of the results
reported in Hoxby (1996) to measurement error.
38
38 Because the COG union construct measures whether a district has a contractEffect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 579
The central conclusion from tables C3–C5 is the classiﬁcation error
reported in tables C1 and C2 in the COG union measureisnotinnocuous.
My results using the Midwest sample are similar to those in Hoxby (1996)
for two of the three comparisons, but switching the union measure il-
lustrates that those results may not be robust to correcting for measure-
ment error. These comparisons underscore the importance of accurately
measuring union status in an analysis of teachers’ union impacts.
What is most interesting about the form of the measurement error bias
is that it is not attenuating, which is the form of bias one would expect
from classical measurement error. Classical measurement error occurs
when the error is uncorrelated with the dependent variable, the indepen-
dent variables, the regression error, and the true value of the variable.
Despite the fact that the measurement error must be correlated with the
true measure of union status as union status is a binary variable, Bound
et al. (2001) show that, as long as the misclassiﬁcation is what Carroll,
Ruppert, and Stefanski (1995) term “nondifferential,” the bias in the co-
efﬁcient still will be attenuating as long as the rest of the classical mea-
surement error assumptions hold. I next turn to an examination of the
apparent measurement error in the COG union measure in order to rec-
oncile the results in tables C3–C5 with the error in variables suggested
by tables C1 and C2.
3. Statistical Properties of the Classiﬁcation Error
Table C1 presents the nonparametric identiﬁcation of the measurement
error in the COG union measure. I now investigate some properties of
this classiﬁcation error and perform a decomposition that breaks the bias
due to the error into the part directly due to measurement error and the
part due to the correlation of the measurement error with the regression
error.
a. Nondifferential Classiﬁcation Error
Let U be union status as measured by the COG variables and let U*
be true union status as indicated by the election certiﬁcation data. If m is
with a teachers’ union and the election certiﬁcation data measure whether ateachers’
union exists for the purpose of collective bargaining, one could argue that the
differences between the estimates in cols. 2 and 3 of tables C3–C5 are due to the
difference between having a union and having a negotiated contract. As discussed
in Sec. II.A of the text, my validation study suggests that most districts achieve a
contract within 1 year of certiﬁcation and no district fails to achieve a contract
conditional on certifying a union. While this difference may cause some attenuation
in the results, it cannot account for the sign change in coefﬁcient estimates and is
likely to be small.580 Lovenheim
the measurement error, then
U p U*  m. (C2)
If one only can observe U instead of , then instead of estimating the U*
true model given by
Y p a  bU*  dX  , (C3)
one must estimate
˜˜˜ ˜ Y p a  bU  dX  , (C4)
where  is the regression error, X is a vector of demographiccharacteristics
assumed to be measured without error, and Y is the outcome variable of
interest that contains no measurement error. The standard result under
the classical measurement error assumption in which m is uncorrelated
with X, Y,o r is that will be less than b in absolute value. In ˜ U*, b
other words, classical measurement error will cause an attenuation bias.
Note that this result holds regardless of the number of independent var-
iables measured with error as long as the classical measurement error
assumptions hold.
When the mismeasured variable is binary, as is the case with union
status, the measurement error (i.e., the classiﬁcation error) cannot be clas-
sical. This result is due to the fact and m will have to be negatively U*
correlated. For example, if , , but if , . U* p 1 m  1,0 U* p 0 m  0,1
Thus, the typical attenuation result does not necessarily hold.
Bound et al. (2001) show that, as long as the misclassiﬁcation is non-
differential and none of the other classical measurementerrorassumptions
are violated, the bias in the coefﬁcient still will be attenuating. Nondif-
ferential classiﬁcation error occurs when reporting errors are independent
of the dependent variable. More formally, this can be written as follows:
Pr(U p iFU* p i,Y) p Pr(U p iFU* p i), (C5)
where I use a linear probability model to test for nondifferential i  0,1.
classiﬁcation error for log real teacher pay, log real current operating
expenditures per student, student-teacher ratios, and high school dropout
rates. Speciﬁcally, I run models of the form
U p a  a Y  h, (C6) 01
where U is an indicator variable that equals ine if the school district is
measured as unionized in the COG, Y are the dependent variables used
in the analysis in the main text, and h is an error term. I perform this test
separately for the probability of correctly classifying a district as union-
ized conditional on being unionized and for the probability of correctlyEffect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 581
Table C6
Tests of Nondifferentiation in the COG Union Measure Classiﬁcation Error
Independent Variable Pr(U p 1FU* p 1,Y)P r ( U p 0FU* p 0,Y)
Log Real teacher pay .356** .076
(.051) (.064)
Log Real expenditures per student .002 .024**
(.015) (.004)
Student-teacher ratio .017** .007**
(.004) (.002)
High school dropout rate .0003 .004**
(.001) (.001)
Note.—Each cell above represents a separate pooled linear probability model regression from the
1972, 1977, 1982, and 1987 Census of Governments and the teachers’ union election certiﬁcation data.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
classifying a district as nonunionized conditional on not being unionized.
The estimates of test for the existence of differential classiﬁcation error. a1
These estimates are presented in table C6.
Assuming that the election certiﬁcation data accurately represent true
union status, the data strongly reject that the measurement error from
the COG is nondifferential. In each row of table C6, the estimates of
are statistically different from zero for at least one of the misclassiﬁ- a1
cation types. The implication of table C6 is that the misclassiﬁcation of
union status in the COG is correlated with the dependent variables of
interest; the classiﬁcation error is differential. The bias due to the error
in variables therefore is not guaranteed to be attenuating. This result is
consistent with the positive biases in absolute value reported in tables
C3–C5 of union effects when the imperfectly measured union measure
is used.
b. Misclassiﬁcation as a Function of X
Thus far, I have established that the intuition about the effect of mea-
surement erroron parameter estimateswhentheerrorinvariablesisclassical
does not hold because m is correlated with (as the error is differential) Y
and with (as the variable is binary). It also is instructive to determine U*
whether the assumption holds that the measurement error is uncorrelated
with the observable X’s. To test the relationship between misclassiﬁcation
and the X’s, I estimate the probability that a district is reportedasunionized
in the COG when it had successfully completed a union election and the
probability a district is reported as nonunion in the COG when no union
election certiﬁcation was on ﬁle, conditional on observables.Moreformally,
I estimate the following models using a linear probability model:
Pr(U p 1FU* p 1,X), (C7)
Pr(U p 0FU* p 0,X). (C8)582 Lovenheim
Table C7
Relationship between Misclassiﬁcation in the Census of Government Union
Measure and the Observables
Independent Variable Pr(U p 1FU* p 1,X)P r ( U p 0FU* p 0,X)
Log Population .035** .009
(.010) (.013)
% Urban .067** .026
(.036) (.041)
Log Average income .007 .042**
(.022) (.007)
Log Median rent .041 .126**
(.036) (.024)
% Poverty .755** .570**
(.268) (.224)
% Unemployed .002** .008**
(.001) (.001)
% Black .001 .022*
(.003) (.012)
% Hispanic .07 .026
(.006) (.020)
% 12–15 years school .001 .008**
(.001) (.002)
%1 6  years school .001 .010**
(.001) (.002)
% Private enrollment .004** .003**
(.001) (.001)
Log Public school enrollment .039** .010
(.010) (.013)
Source.—Author’s calculations from the 1972, 1982, and 1987 Census of Governments; the 1970,
1980, and 1990 U.S. Census; and the teachers’ union election certiﬁcation data, described in the text.
Note.—Each cell above represents a separate pooled linear probability model regression. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Table C7 contains the results from these regressions from the pooled 1970,
1980, and 1990 U.S. Census and COG data described in the main text.
Each cell in the table represents a separate regression. AstableC7illustrates,
the probability of misclassifying a district’s union status is correlated with
the observable demographic characteristics of the district. Some general
trends do emerge from table C7: smaller, less urban districts with lower
public school enrollment are less likely to be correctly classiﬁed as union-
ized, while those districts with lower average income, lower median rent,
and a smaller proportion of BA recipients are more likely to bemisclassiﬁed
as unionized. School districts with a higher percentage of residents with 12
or more years of schooling are less likely to be classiﬁed as unionized
regardless of true union status, and conversely, districts with a higher per-
centage of private enrollment have a higher probability of being classiﬁed
as unionized regardless of true union status. Finally, those districts with
higher poverty and unemployment rates have a higher probability of being
misclassiﬁed conditional on their true union status. The assumption nec-
essary for classical measurement error that the error is independent of the
correctly measured observables clearly does not hold in the data.Effect of Teachers’ Union on Education Production 583
c. BBDR Decompositions
Since the misclassiﬁcation error is correlated with both the dependent
variables and the independent variables in the union impact regressions,
it is interesting to determine the extent to which each of these correlations
cause the observed differences in the estimated union effects. Bound et
al. (1994) propose a decomposition of the difference between the biased
coefﬁcient and the unbiased coefﬁcient into the difference directly due
to measurement error and the difference due to the correlation of the
measurement error with the regression error (Bound-Brown-Duncan-
Rodgers [BBDR] decomposition).
39 More formally, let
 Z p [UFX] (C9)
be a matrix of all the data. Then
 1  ˜ b p (ZZ) ZY
 1  p (ZZ) Z [Z*b  ]
 1  p (ZZ) Z [(Z  m)b  ] (C10)
 1  1  p (ZZ) ZZ b  (ZZ) Z [mb  ]
 1  1  p b  (ZZ) Zmb  (ZZ) Z
⇔
 1  1  ˜ b  b p (ZZ) Zmb  (ZZ) Z
p (E[mFU p 1, X]  E[mFU p 0,X])b  (E[FU p 1,X] (C11)
 E[FU p 0,X]),
where the last line follows from the fact only union status is assumed to
be measured with error in the data. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side
of equation (C11) gives the part of the total difference that is due to
measurement error, while the second term shows the part of the total
difference that is due to the correlation between the measurement error
and the regression error. I perform this decomposition separately for each
of the four dependent variables used above in a model thatincludesdistrict
ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed effects, and district-speciﬁc linear time trends. The
coefﬁcient estimates are thus identical to those reported in tables C3–C5.
Table C8 presents the results of the BBDR decompositions. As is evi-
dent from the table, both forms of bias are present. These biases reinforce
39 See Black, Sanders, and Taylor (2003) for an implementation of the BBDR
decomposition similar to the one presented here.584 Lovenheim
Table C8
BBDR Decompositions
Dependent Variable
COG
Estimate
Union
Election
Estimate
Total
Difference
Difference
from
Measurement
Error
Difference
from Correlation
of Measurement
Error and
Regression Error
Log Real teacher pay .054 .019 .073 .018 .054
Log Real expendi-
tures per student .017 .010 .027 .010 .017
Student-teacher ratio .117 .189 .306 .183 .124
High school dropout
rate .589 1.385 .796 1.332 .536
Source.—Author’s calculations from the 1972, 1982, and 1987 Census of Governments; the 1970,
1980, and 1990 U.S. Census; and the teachers’ union election certiﬁcation data, described in the text.
Note.—Each regression includes district and year ﬁxed effects as well as district-speciﬁc linear time
trends.
each other for log real teacher pay, log real current operating expenditures
per student, and student-teacher ratios in this sample. The bias due to
measurement error implies that the direct effect of wrongly classifying a
district as unionized is to increase the estimated union effect on teacher
pay, expenditures per student, and student-teacher ratios. This result oc-
curs because nonunionized districts have higher pay, expenditures, and
class sizes than unionized districts, so misclassifying nonunionized dis-
tricts as unionized will bias upward the estimated impact of teachers’
unions on all three measures. That the classiﬁcation error is positively
correlated with the regression error for the three inputs is due to the fact
that school districts incorrectly classiﬁed as unionized tend to have higher
levels of teacher pay, expenditures, and student-teacher ratios than school
districts for which union classiﬁcation is correct. Thus, the misclassiﬁ-
cation of union status will serve to bias further upward the union impact
estimates on these variables.
For the high school dropout rate decompositions, the biases offset each
other somewhat, but the relatively large negative effect from measurement
error dominates the positive correlation between the measurement error
and the regression error. Nonunion schools tend to have lower dropout
rates than union schools, which is partially offset by the fact that districts
wrongly classiﬁed as unionized have higher dropout rates.
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